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Abstract
In our previous paper, “A Unified Approach to Systemic Risk Measures via Ac-
ceptance Set” (Mathematical Finance, 2018 ), we have introduced a general class of
systemic risk measures that allow for random allocations to individual banks before
aggregation of their risks. In the present paper, we prove the dual representation of a
particular subclass of such systemic risk measures and the existence and uniqueness of
the optimal allocation related to them. We also introduce an associated utility maxi-
mization problem which has the same optimal solution as the systemic risk measure.
In addition, the optimizer in the dual formulation provides a risk allocation which
is fair from the point of view of the individual financial institutions. The case with
exponential utilities which allows for explicit computation is treated in details.
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1 Introduction
Consider a vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P,RN ) of N random variables denoting
a configuration of risky (financial) factors at a future time T associated to a system of N
financial institutions/banks.
One of the first proposals in the framework of risk measures to measure the systemic
risk of X, see [16], was to consider the map
ρ(X) := inf{m ∈ R | Λ(X) +m ∈ A} , (1.1)
where
Λ : RN → R,
is an aggregation rule that aggregates the N -dimensional risk factors into a univariate risk
factor, and
A ⊆L0(Ω,F ,P,R),
is an acceptance set of real valued random variables. As within the framework of univariate
monetary risk measures, systemic risk might again be interpreted as the minimal cash
amount that secures the system when it is added to the total aggregated system loss
Λ(X), given that Λ(X) allows for a monetary loss interpretation. Note, however, that
in (1.1) systemic risk is the minimal capital added to secure the system after aggregating
individual risks.
It might be more relevant to measure systemic risk as the minimal cash that secures
the aggregated system by adding the capital into the single institutions before aggregating
their individual risks. This way of measuring systemic risk can be expressed by
ρ(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
mi |m = (m1, · · · ,mN ) ∈ R
N , Λ(X+ m) ∈ A
}
. (1.2)
Here, the amount mi is added to the financial position X
i of institution i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
before the corresponding total loss Λ(X+m) is computed (we refer to [3], [7] and [27]).
One of the main novelty of our paper [7] was the possibility of adding to X not merely
a vector m = (m1, · · · ,mN ) ∈ R
N of deterministic cash, but, more generally, a random
vector Y ∈ C for some given class C. In particular, the main example considered in [7] and
studied further in this paper, is given by choosing the aggregation function
Λ(x) =
N∑
n=1
un(xn)
for utility functions un, n = 1, · · · , N , the acceptance set A = {Z ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P,R), E[Z] ≥
B} for a given constant B, and the class C such that
C ⊆ CR ∩ L, where CR :=
{
Y ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P,RN ) |
N∑
n=1
Y n ∈ R
}
, (1.3)
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where the subspace L ⊆ L0(Ω,F ,P,RN ) will be specified later. Here, the notation∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R means that
∑N
n=1 Y
n is equal to some deterministic constant in R, even
though each single Y n, n = 1, · · · , N , is a random variable. Under these assumptions the
systemic risk measure considered in [7] takes the form
ρ(X) := inf
Y∈C⊂CR
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
, (1.4)
and can still be interpreted as the minimal total cash amount
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R needed today
to secure the system by distributing the cash at the future time T among the components
of the risk vector X. However, while the total capital requirement
∑N
n=1 Y
n is determined
today, contrary to (1.2) the individual allocation Y i(ω) to institution i does not need to be
decided today but in general depends on the scenario ω realized at time T . This total cash
amount ρ(X) is composed today through the formula
∑N
n=1 ρ
n(X) = ρ(X), where each
ρn(X) ∈ R is the risk allocation of each bank, as explained in Definition 1.2. Thus, one
prominent example that can be modelled by considering random allocations is the default
fund of a CCP that is liable for any participating institution. We will come back to this
mechanism in Section 5.
By considering scenario dependent allocations we are also taking into account the pos-
sible dependencies among the banks, as the budget constraints in (1.4) will not depend
only on the marginal distribution of X, as it would happen for deterministic Y n.
Definition 1.1. We say that the scenario dependent allocation YX = (Y
n
X)n=1,...N ∈ C is
a systemic optimal allocation for ρ(X), defined in (1.4), if it satisfies ρ(X) =
∑N
n=1 Y
n
X
and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y nX))
]
≥ B .
As two of the main results of the paper
• we study in Section 3 the dual formulation of the systemic risk measure (1.4):
ρ(X) = max
Q∈D
{
N∑
n=1
EQn[−X
n]− αB(Q)
}
, (1.5)
where Q := (Q1, · · · , QN ), and the penalty function αB and the domain D are
specified in Section 3. In particular, we establish existence and uniqueness of the
optimizer QX ∈ D of (1.5).
• we show in Section 4 existence and uniqueness of the systemic optimal allocation YX
for the systemic risk measure (1.4).
We now associate to the risk minimization problem (1.4) the following related utility max-
imization problem that will play a central role in this paper:
π(X) := sup
Y∈C⊂CR
{
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
|
N∑
n=1
Y n ≤ A
}
. (1.6)
3
If we interpret
∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n) as the aggregated utility of the system after allocating
Y, then π(X) can be interpreted as the maximal expected utility of the system over all
random allocations Y ∈ C such that the aggregated budget constraint
∑N
n=1 Y
n ≤ A holds
for a given constant A. In the following, we may write ρ(X) = ρB(X) and π(X) = πA(X)
in order to express the dependence on the minimal level of expected utility B ∈ R and on
the maximal budget level A ∈ R, respectively. We will see in Section 4.1 that
B = πA(X) if and only if A = ρB(X),
and, in these cases, the two problems πA(X) and ρB(X) have the same unique optimal
solution YX. From this, we infer that once a level ρ(X) of total systemic risk has been
determined, then
• the systemic optimal allocation YX for ρ maximizes the expected system utility among
all random allocations of total cost less or equal to ρ(X).
Once the total systemic risk has been identified as ρ(X), the second essential question is
how to allocate the total risk to the individual institutions.
Definition 1.2. We say that a vector (ρn(X))n=1,...,N ∈ R
N is a systemic risk allocation
of ρ(X) if it fulfills
∑N
n=1 ρ
n(X) = ρ(X).
The requirement
∑N
n=1 ρ
n(X) = ρ(X) is known as the “Full Allocation” property, see
for example [13]. In the case of deterministic allocations Y ∈ RN , i.e. C = RN , the optimal
deterministicYX represents a canonical risk allocation ρ
n(X) := Y nX. For general (random)
allocations Y ∈ C ⊂ CR, we do not have any more such canonical way to determine ρ
n(X),
however we will provide evidence that a good choice is:
ρn(X) := EQn
X
[Y nX] for n = 1, · · · , N, (1.7)
where QX is the optimizer of the dual problem (1.5).
To this end, suppose that a probability vectorQ = (Q1, · · · , QN ) is given for the system
and consider an alternative formulation of the systemic utility maximization problem in
terms of the valuation provided by Q:
πQ(X) = πQA (X) := sup
Y∈L
{
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
|
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] ≤ A
}
. (1.8)
Note that in (1.8) (as well as in (1.9)) the allocation Y belongs to a vector space L of
random variables (introduced later) without requiring that Y ∈ CR (that is adding up to
a deterministic quantity). Thus, for πQ(X) we maximize the expected systemic utility
among all Y ∈ L satisfying the budget constraint
∑N
n=1 EQn [Y
n] ≤ A.
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Similarily, we can introduce a systemic risk measure in terms of the vector of probability
measures Q by
ρQ(X) = ρQB (X) := inf
Y∈L
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
, (1.9)
For ρQ(X), we thus look for the minimal systemic cost
∑N
n=1 EQn [Y
n] among all Y ∈ L
satisfying the acceptability (utility) constraint E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B.
A priori, ρ and ρQ defined in (1.4) and (1.9) are quite different objects: even if they both
subsume the same systemic budget constraint, ρ is defined only through the computation
of the cash amount
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R, while in ρQ the risk is defined by calculating the value
(or the cost) of the random allocations:
∑N
n=1 EQn [Y
n]. A similar comparison applies to
π and πQ.
Remark 1.3. To better understand such comparison, we make an analogy with the classical
(univariate) utility maximization from terminal wealth in securities markets. Let K :=
{(H.S)T | H admissible}, where (H.S)T is the stochastic integral, and let
U(x) = sup {E [u(x+K)] | K ∈ K}
be the utility from the initial wealth x ∈ R and from optimally investing in the securities
S adopting admissible strategies H. In this case, there is no need to introduce a cost
operator, as we are investing in replicable contingent claims having, by definition, initial
value x. On the contrary,
UQ(x) = sup {E [u(x+K)] | EQ [K] ≤ 0}
is the optimal utility function when a probability vector Q is given. A priori, the two prob-
lems are of different nature, unless one shows (see i.e. [6]) that for a particular probability
measure Qx the two problems have the same optimal value and:
U(x) = UQx(x) = min
Q∈M
UQ(x)
where M is the set of martingale measures. From the mathematical point of view, once
the minimax martingale measure Qx is determined, U
Qx(x) is easier to solve than U(x),
and the solution to UQx(x) can then be used to find the solution to U(x). Also for the
financial application, one may use Qx to compute the fair price (see [21] and Remark 3.2.2
[23]) of a contingent claim C by computing EQx [C] .
In view of the analogy in the above remark, in this paper we also prove that
(i) the optimizer QX = (Q
1
X, · · ·Q
N
X) of the dual problem (1.5) satisfies:
ρB(X) = ρ
QX
B (X), πA(X) = π
QX
A (X);
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(ii) all these four problems have the same (unique) optimal solution YX, when A :=
ρB(X);
(iii) QX provides a systemic risk allocation (EQ1
X
[Y 1X], · · · , (EQNX
[Y NX ]), with
N∑
n=1
EQXn [Y
n
X] = ρB(X), (1.10)
(iv) and
ρB(X) = max
Q∈D
ρQB (X) = ρ
QX
B (X),
where the domain D is defined in (3.3) and it replaces, in the analogy with utility
maximization, the set of martingale measures.
Hence ρQXB is a valid alternative to ρB (same value and optimal solution) and this justifies
its use to compute the systemic risk. In addition, (1.10) shows that the operator assigned
by EQX [·] evaluates the risk component Y
n
X of the optimal allocation accordingly to ρB
(not only to ρQXB ) and proves that the definition in (1.7) provides indeed a systemic risk
allocation for ρ(X). In Section 5, we further elaborate on this interpretation, we study
in detail the properties of the systemic risk probability vector QX and in particular we
provide the formula for the marginal risk contribution:
d
dε
ρ(X+εV)|ε=0 = −
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[V n] for V ∈L.
We also discuss certain properties inferred from the above results that argue for the fairness
of the systemic risk allocation.
Based on the above exposition, we structure the remaining paper as follows. In Section
2 we introduce the technical setting within Orlicz spaces and the main assumptions, and
we show that our optimization problems are well posed. In Section 3 we study the dual
representation (1.5) of the systemic risk measure, notably existence and uniqueness of
the dual optimizer QX is proved in Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 4.13. In Section 4
we deal with existence and uniqueness of optimal solutions of the primal problems (1.4),
(1.6) and (1.8), (1.9). To guarantee existence, we need to enlarge the environment and
consider appropriate spaces of integrable random variables. In Section 5 we derive cash
additivity and risk marginal contribution properties of the systemic risk measure ρ(X), and
fairness properties of the optimal allocations ρn(X). The case with exponential utilities and
grouping of institutions will be treated in details in Section 6, where additional sensitivity
and monotonicity properties will be established as well.
We conclude this Section with a literature overview on systemic risk. In [20], [12] and
[19] one can find empirical studies on banking networks, while interbank lending has been
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studied via interacting diffusions and mean field approach in several papers like [31], [29],
[15], [38], [5]. Among the many contributions on systemic risk modeling, we mention the
classical contagion model proposed by [26], the default model of [34], the illiquidity cascade
models of [33], [37] and [40], the asset fire sale cascade model by [18] and [14], as well as the
model in [46] that additionally includes cross-holdings. Further works on network modeling
are [1], [44], [2], [35], [4], [24] and [25]. See also the references therein. For an exhaustive
overview on the literature on systemic risk we refer the reader to the recent volumes of [36]
and of [30].
2 The setting
We now introduce the setting and discuss some fundamental properties of our systemic risk
measures. Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), we consider the space of random vectors
L0 := L0(P;RN ) := {X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) | Xn ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P;R), n = 1, · · · , N}.
The measurable space (Ω,F) will be fixed throughout the paper and will not appear in
the notations. Unless we need to specify a different probability, we will also suppress P
from the notations and simply write L0(RN ). In addition, we will sometimes suppress
R
d, d = 1, ..., N, in the notation of the vector spaces, when the dimension of the random
vector is clear from the context. We assume that L0(RN ) is a vector lattice equipped with
componentwise order relation: X1 ≥ X2 if X
i
1 ≥ X
i
2 P-a.s. for all i = 1, · · · , N.
When Q = (Q1, ..., QN ) is a vector of probability measures on (Ω,F), we set L1(Q) :=
{X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) | Xn ∈ L1(Qn), n = 1, · · · , N}. Unless differently stated, all inequal-
ities between random vectors are meant to be P-a.s. inequalities.
A vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) ∈ L0 denotes a configuration of risky factors at a future
time T associated to a system of N entities.
2.1 Orlicz setting
We will consider systemic risk measures defined on Orlicz spaces, see [41] for further details
on Orlicz spaces. This presents several advantages. From a mathematical point of view,
it is a more general setting than L∞, but at the same time it simplifies the analysis, since
the topology is order continuous and there are no singular elements in the dual space.
Furthermore, it has been shown in [10] that the Orlicz setting is the natural one to embed
utility maximization problems, as the natural integrability condition E[u(X)] > −∞ is
implied by E[φ(X)] < +∞. Univariate convex risk measures on Orlicz spaces have been
introduced and studied by [17] and [9].
Let u : R → R be a concave and increasing function satisfying limx→−∞
u(x)
x
= +∞.
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Consider φ(x) := −u(−|x|) + u(0). Then φ : R → [0,+∞) is a strict Young function, i.e.,
it is finite valued, even and convex on R with φ(0) = 0 and limx→+∞
φ(x)
x
= +∞. The
Orlicz space Lφ and Orlicz Heart Mφ are respectively defined by
Lφ :=
{
X ∈ L0(R) | E[φ(αX)] < +∞ for some α > 0
}
, (2.1)
Mφ :=
{
X ∈ L0(R) | E[φ(αX)] < +∞ for all α > 0
}
, (2.2)
and they are Banach spaces when endowed with the Luxemburg norm. The topological
dual of Mφ is the Orlicz space Lφ
∗
, where the convex conjugate φ∗ of φ, defined by
φ∗(y) := sup
x∈R
{xy − φ(x)} , y ∈ R,
is also a strict Young function. Note that
E[u(X)] > −∞ if E[φ(X)] < +∞. (2.3)
Remark 2.1. It is well known that L∞(P;R) ⊆ Mφ ⊆ Lφ ⊆ L1(P;R). In addition, from
the Fenchel inequality xy ≤ φ(x) + φ∗(y) we obtain
(α|X|)
(
λ
dQ
dP
)
≤ φ(α|X|) + φ∗
(
λ
dQ
dP
)
for some probability measure Q ≪ P, and we immediately deduce that dQ
dP
∈ Lφ
∗
implies
Lφ ⊆ L1(Q;R).
Given the utility functions u1, · · · , uN : R → R, satisfying the above conditions, with
associated Young functions φ1, · · · , φN , we define
L = MΦ := Mφ1 × · · · ×MφN , LΦ := Lφ1 × · · · × LφN . (2.4)
2.2 Assumptions and some properties of ρ
We consider systemic risk measures ρ : MΦ → R∪{∞}∪{−∞} with
ρ(X) := inf
Y∈C⊂CR
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
, (2.5)
as in (1.4), where the notation E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B also means that
∑N
n=1 un(X
n+
Y n) ∈ L1(P) and the linear space CR was introduced in (1.3). Note that there is no loss of
generality in assuming that un(0) = 0 (simply replace B with B −
∑N
n=1 un(0)).
The following are standing assumptions for the rest of the paper.
Assumption 2.2. 1. C0 ⊆ CR and C = C0∩M
Φ is a convex cone satisfying RN ⊆ C ⊆ CR.
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2. For all n = 1, · · · , N , un : R → R is increasing, strictly concave, differentiable and
satisfies the Inada conditions
u′n(−∞) := lim
x→−∞
u′n(x) = +∞, u
′
n(+∞) := lim
x→+∞
u′n(x) = 0.
3. B < Λ(+∞), i.e., there exists M ∈ RN such that
∑N
n=1 un(M
n) ≥ B.
4. For all n = 1, · · · , N , it holds that for any probability measure Q≪ P
E
[
vn
(
dQ
dP
)]
<∞ iff E
[
vn
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
<∞, ∀λ > 0,
where vn(y) := supx∈R {un(x)− xy} denotes the convex conjugate of un.
Also, from the Fenchel inequality un(X) ≤ X
dQ
dP
+ vn
(
dQ
dP
)
P a.s., we immediately deduce
that if X ∈ L1(Q) and E
[
vn
(
dQ
dP
)]
< ∞ for some probability measure Q ≪ P, then
E [un (X)] < +∞. We remark that some further useful properties of the convex conjugate
vn are collected in Lemma A.5.
Item 4 in Assumption 2.2 is related to the Reasonable Asymptotic Elasticity condition
on utility functions, which was introduced in [45]. This assumption, even though quite weak
(see [8] Section 2.2), is fundamental to guarantee the existence of the optimal solution to
classical utility maximization problems (see [45] and [8]). In this paper it is necessary in
Section A.3 and for the results of Section 4.
Remark 2.3. Note that the duality results presented in Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 hold true
even under the following weaker assumptions on the utility functions: For all n = 1, ..., N ,
un is increasing, concave and limx→−∞
un(x)
x
= +∞.
The domain of ρ is defined by dom(ρ) :=
{
X ∈MΦ | ρ(X) < +∞
}
. The proof of the
following proposition, which exploits the behavior of un at −∞, is given in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.4. (a) For all X ∈MΦ we have ρ(X) > −∞. The map ρ : MΦ →
R∪{+∞} defined in (2.5) is finitely valued, monotone decreasing, convex, continuous
and subdifferentiable on the Orlicz Heart MΦ = dom(ρ).
(b) Furthermore
ρ(X) = ρ=(X) := inf
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
= B
}
, X ∈ dom(ρ).
If there exists an optimal allocation YX = {Y
n
X}n ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ of ρ(X), then it is
unique.
Example 2.5. We complete this subsection by introducing one relevant example for the set
of admissible random elements, which we denote by C(n).
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Definition 2.6. For h ∈ {1, · · · , N}, let n := (n1, · · · , nh) ∈ N
h, with nm−1 < nm for
all m = 1, · · · , h, n0 := 0 and nh := N . We set Im := {nm−1 + 1, · · · , nm} for each
m = 1, · · · , h. We introduce the following family of allocations C(n) = C
(n)
0 ∩M
Φ, where
C
(n)
0 =
{
Y ∈ L0(RN ) | ∃ d = (d1, · · · , dh) ∈ R
h :
∑
i∈Im
Y i = dm for m = 1, · · · , h
}
⊆ CR. (2.6)
Definition 2.6 models a cluster C = (C1, · · · , Ch) of financial institutions, which is a
partition of
{
X1, · · · ,XN
}
. The constraint on Y is then that the components of Y must
sum up to a real number in each element Ci of the cluster, i.e.,
∑
j∈Ci
Y j ∈ R.
For a given n := (n1, · · · , nh), the values (d1, · · · , dh) may change, but the number of
elements in each of the h groups Im is fixed by n. It is then easily seen that C
(n) is a linear
space containing RN and closed with respect to convergence in probability. We point out
that the family C(n) admits two extreme cases:
(i) the strongest restriction occurs when h = N, i.e. we consider exactly N groups, and
in this case C(n) = RN corresponds to the deterministic case;
(ii) on the opposite side, we have only one group h = 1 and C(n) = CR∩M
Φ is the largest
possible class, corresponding to arbitrary random injection Y ∈MΦ with the only
constraint
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R.
3 Dual representation of ρ
We now investigate the dual representation of systemic risk measures of the form (2.5).
When Z ∈ MΦ and ξ ∈ LΦ
∗
, we set E[ξZ] :=
∑N
n=1 E[ξ
nZn] and, for dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
+ , EQ[Z] =∑N
n=1 EQn [Z
n]. We will frequently identify the density dQ
dP
with the associated probability
measure Q≪ P.
Proposition 3.1. For any X ∈MΦ,
ρB(X) = max
Q∈D
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−X
n]− αB(Q)
}
, (3.1)
where the penalty function is given by
αB(Q) := sup
Z∈A
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−Z
n]
}
, (3.2)
with A :=
{
Z ∈MΦ |
∑N
n=1 E[un(Z
n)] ≥ B
}
and
D := dom(αB)∩
{
dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
+ | Q
n(Ω) = 1 ∀n and
N∑
n=1
(EQn [Y
n]− Y n) ≤ 0 for all Y ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ
}
,
(3.3)
where dom(αB) :=
{
Q = (Q1, · · · , QN ) | Qn << P ∀n and αB(Q) < +∞
}
.
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(i) Suppose that for some i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}, i 6= j, we have ±(ei1A − ej1A) ∈ C for all
A ∈ F . Then
D = dom(αB)∩
{
dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
+ | Q
n(Ω) = 1 ∀n, Qi = Qj and
N∑
n=1
(EQn [Y
n]− Y n) ≤ 0 for all Y ∈ C
}
.
(ii) Suppose that ±(ei1A − ej1A) ∈ C for all i, j and all A ∈ F . Then
D = dom(αB) ∩
{
dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
+ | Q
n(Ω) = 1, Qn = Q, ∀n
}
.
Proof. The dual representation (3.1) is a consequence of Proposition 2.4, Theorem A.2
and of Propositions 3.9 and 3.11 in [32], taking into consideration that C is a convex cone,
the dual space of the Orlicz Heart MΦ is the Orlicz space LΦ
∗
and MΦ = dom(ρ). Note
that from Theorem A.2 we know that the dual elements ξ ∈ LΦ
∗
+ are positive but a priori
not normalized. However, we obtain E[ξn] = 1 by taking as Y = ±ej ∈ R
N , and using∑N
n=1(ξ
n(Y n) − Y n) ≤ 0 for all Y ∈ C, so that ξj(1) − 1 ≤ 0 and ξj(−1) + 1 ≤ 0 imply
ξj(1) = 1. This shows the form of the domain D in (3.3). Furthermore:
(i) Take Y := ei1A−ej1A ∈ C. From
∑N
n=1(Q
n(Y n)−Y n) ≤ 0 we obtain Qi(1A)−1A+
Qj(−1A)+1A ≤ 0, i.e., Q
i(A)−Qj(A) ≤ 0 and similarly taking Y := −ei1A+ej1A ∈
C, we get Qj(A) −Qi(A) ≤ 0.
(ii) From (i), we obtainQi = Qj . In addition, we get
∑N
n=1(EQ[Y
n]−Y n) = EQ[
∑N
n=1 Y
n]−∑N
n=1 Y
n) = 0, as
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R.
Proposition 3.1 guarantees the existence of a maximizer QX to the dual problem (3.1) and
that αB(QX) < +∞. Uniqueness will be proved in Corollary 4.13.
Definition 3.2. Let X ∈MΦ. An optimal solution of the dual problem (3.1) is a vector of
probability measures QX = (Q
1
X, · · · , Q
N
X) verifying
dQX
dP
∈ D and
ρB(X) =
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]− αB(QX). (3.4)
A vector Q of probability measures having density in D could be viewed, in the systemic
N -dimensional one period setting, as the counterpart of the notion of (P-absolutely contin-
uous) martingale measures. Indeed, as Y ∈ C0 ⊆ CR,
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R is the total amount to
be allocated to the N institutions and then the total cost or value
∑N
n=1 EQn [Y
n] should
at most be equal to
∑N
n=1 Y
n, for any “fair” valuation operator EQ[·], which is the case if
dQ
dP
∈ D.
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There exists a simple relation among ρB , ρ
Q
B and αB(Q) defined in (2.5), (1.9), and
(3.2), respectively.
Proposition 3.3. We have
ρQB (X) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn [X
n]− αB(Q), (3.5)
and
ρB(X) = max
dQ
dP
∈D
ρQB (X) = ρ
QX
B (X), (3.6)
where QX is an optimal solution of the dual problem (3.1).
Proof. We have
−αB(Q) = inf
{
N∑
n=1
EQn[Z
n] | Z ∈MΦ and
N∑
n=1
E[un(Z
n)] ≥ B
}
= inf
{
N∑
n=1
EQn[X
n + Y n] | Y ∈MΦ and
N∑
n=1
E[un(X
n + Y n)] ≥ B
}
=
N∑
n=1
EQn[X
n] + ρQB (X),
which proves (3.5). Then from (3.5) and (3.4) we deduce
ρQXB (X) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Xn]− αB(QX) = ρB(X)
and from (3.1) and (3.5) ρB(X) = maxQ∈D ρ
Q
B (X).
Proposition 3.4. When αB(Q) < +∞, then the penalty function in (3.2) can be written
as
αB(Q) := sup
Z∈A
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−Z
n]
}
= inf
λ>0
(
−
1
λ
B +
1
λ
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)])
, (3.7)
and E
[
vn
(
λdQ
n
dP
)]
< ∞ for all n and all λ > 0. In addition, the infimum is attained in
(3.7), i.e.,
αB (Q) =
N∑
n=1
E
[
dQn
dP
v′n
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
)]
, (3.8)
where λ∗ > 0 is the unique solution of the equation1
−B +
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]
− λ
N∑
n=1
E
[
dQn
dP
v′n
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]
= 0. (3.9)
1Note that λ∗ will depend on B, (un)n=1,··· ,N and
(
dQn
dP
)
n=1,··· ,N
.
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Proof. In Appendix A.2.1.
Example 3.5. Consider the grouping of Example 2.5. As C(n) is a linear space containing
R
N , the dual representation (3.1) applies. In addition in each group we have ±(ei1A −
ej1A) ∈ C
(n) for all i, j in the same group and for all A ∈ F . Therefore, in each group
the components Qi, i ∈ Im, of the dual elements are all the same, i.e., Q
i = Qj, for all
i, j ∈ Im, and the representation (3.1) becomes
ρB(X) = max
Q∈D

h∑
m=1
∑
k∈Im
(
EQm[−X
k]
)
− αB(Q)
 = maxQ∈D
{
h∑
m=1
EQm [−Xm]− αB(Q)
}
,
(3.10)
with
D := dom(αB) ∩
{
dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
+ | Q
i = Qj ∀i, j ∈ Im, Q
i(Ω) = 1
}
(3.11)
and Xm :=
∑
k∈Im
Xk. Indeed,
N∑
n=1
(EQn [Y
n]− Y n) =
h∑
m=1
∑
k∈Im
(EQm [Y
k]− Y k) =
h∑
m=1
EQm
∑
k∈Im
Y k
− ∑
k∈Im
Y k
 = 0,
as
∑
k∈Im
Y k = dm ∈ R. If we have only one single group, all components of a dual element
Q ∈ D are the same.
When Q = (Q1, · · · , Qn)n=1,··· ,N ∈ D, defined in (3.11), then (EQ1 [Y
1
X], ...,EQN [Y
N
X ])
is a systemic risk allocation as in Definition (1.1), i.e.,
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n
X] =
h∑
m=1
∑
k∈Im
EQm[Y
k
X] =
h∑
m=1
EQm
∑
k∈Im
Y kX
 = h∑
m=1
dm = ρ(X). (3.12)
Example 3.6. Consider un : R→ R, un(x) = −e
−αnx/αn, αn > 0 for each n, and let B < 0.
Then, v′n(y) =
1
αn
ln(y). From the first order condition (3.9) we obtain that the minimizer
is λ∗ = −B
β
, with β :=
∑N
n=1
1
αn
. Therefore, from (3.8) we have
αB(Q) =
N∑
n=1
E
[
dQn
dP
v′n
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
)]
=
N∑
n=1
1
αn
(
H (Qn,P) + ln
(
−
B
β
))
, (3.13)
where H (Qn,P) := E
[
dQn
dP
ln
(
dQn
dP
)]
is the relative entropy.
4 Existence of the optimal solutions
In this section we deal with existence and uniqueness of optimal allocations for ρB(X) and
the other related primal optimization problems introduced in Section 1. Throughout
this entire section, we assume X ∈ MΦ and that Q = (Q1, ..., QN ) satisfies Qn ≪ P,
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dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
and αB(Q) < +∞, or equivalently ρ
Q
B (X) > −∞. Recall from Proposition 3.4
that this implies E
[
vn
(
λdQ
n
dP
)]
< +∞ for all n and all λ > 0. Set
L1(P;Q) := (L1(P;RN ) ∩ L1(Q;RN )) ⊇ LΦ ⊇MΦ, (4.1)
where the inclusions follow from Remark 2.1 and dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
.
W.l.o.g. we may assume that ui(0) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N and observe that then
ui(xi) = ui(x
+
i ) + ui(−x
−
i ). (4.2)
When the utility functions un are of exponential type, the Orlicz Heart M
Φ is sufficiently
large and contains the optimal allocation YX to ρB(X), see Section 6. This of course also
happens in the case of general utility functions on a finite probability space.
As shown in Section 4.3, in general, we cannot expect to find the optimal solution YQ for
the problem ρQB (X) in the spaceM
Φ, but only in the larger space L1(Q) and this motivates
the introduction of several extended problems.
Let B ∈ R and define
ρ˜QB (X) : = inf
Y∈L1(P;Q)
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
,
ρ̂QB (X) : = inf
Y∈L1(Q)
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
,
ρ˜B(X) : = inf
Y∈C0∩L1(P;QX)
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
.
Analogously, we define π˜QA (X), π̂
Q
A (X) and π˜A(X) for A ∈ R by using optimization (1.8).
We will show in (4.9) and (4.10), that these extensions from MΦ to integrable random
variables do not change the optimal values.
In order to prove the existence of the optimal allocation for ρ˜B(X) we will proceed in several
steps. In Theorem 4.10 we first prove the existence of the optimal solution ŶQ ∈ L
1(Q) for
ρ̂QB (X). Then in Proposition 4.11 we show that the optimizer to ρB(X) or to ρ˜B(X), when
it exists, coincides with ŶQX ∈ L
1(QX). The next key step is to show the existence of
Y ∈ L1(P) which is, as specified in Theorem 4.14, the candidate solution to the extended
problem and then to prove thatY ∈ L1(QX). In a final step (see Theorem 4.19, Proposition
4.22 and Corollary 4.23) we prove that ρB(X) = ρ˜B(X) and that such Y ∈ L
1(P;QX),
hereafter denoted with Y˜X, is the optimizer of the extended problem ρ˜B(X), and hence it
coincides with ŶQX .
4.1 On ρB(X) and piA(X).
Recall that under Assumptions 2.2, C is a convex cone and therefore, if Y ∈ C, then
Y + δ ∈ C for every deterministic δ ∈ RN . Note that ρQB (X) < +∞ and π
Q
A (X) > −∞.
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Proposition 4.1. (a) B = πA(X) if and only if A = ρB(X).
(b) If B = π˜A(X) then A = ρ˜B(X).
(c) In case A = ρB(X) and there exists an optimal solution of one of the two problems
πA(X) or ρB(X), then it is the unique optimal solution of both problems.
Proof. (a) (⇐) Let A = ρB(X) and suppose first that πA(X) > B. Then there must
exist Y˜ ∈ C0 ∩ M
Φ such that
∑N
n=1 Y˜
n ≤ A and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y˜ n)
]
> B. The
continuity of un and E[un(Z
n)] > −∞ for all Z ∈ MΦ imply that there exists ε > 0 and
Ŷ := Y˜ − ε1 ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ such that E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Ŷ n)
]
≥ B and
∑N
n=1 Ŷ
n < A. This
is in contradiction with A = ρB(X).
Suppose now that πA(X) < B. Then there exists δ > 0 such that
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≤ B − δ,
for all Y ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ such that
∑N
n=1 Y
n ≤ A. As A = ρB(X), for all ε > 0, there exists
Yε ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ such that
∑N
n=1 Y
n
ε ≤ A + ε and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y nε )
]
≥ B. For any
η ≥ ε ≥
∑N
n=1 Y
n
ε −A, we get
∑N
n=1(Y
n
ε −
η
N
) ≤ A+ ε− η ≤ A. By the continuity of un
and E[un(Z
n)] > −∞ for all Z ∈ MΦ, we may select ε > 0 and η ≥ ε small enough so
that E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y nε −
η
N
)
]
> B − δ. As Ŷ := (Y nε −
η
N
)n ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ, we obtain a
contradiction.
(⇒) Let B = πA(X) and suppose first that ρB(X) < A. Then, there must exist
Y˜ ∈ C0∩M
Φ such that E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y˜ n)
]
≥ B and
∑N
n=1 Y˜
n < A. Then, there exists
ε > 0 and Ŷ := Y˜+ε1 ∈ C0∩M
Φ such that
∑N
n=1 Ŷ
n ≤ A and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Ŷ n)
]
>
B. This is in contradiction with B = πA(X).
Suppose now that ρB(X) > A. Then, there exists δ > 0 such that
∑N
n=1 Y
n ≥ A + δ
for all Y ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ such that E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B. As B = πA(X), for all ε > 0
there exists Yε ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ such that E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y nε )
]
> B − ε and
∑N
n=1 Y
n
ε ≤ A.
Define ηε := inf
{
a > 0 : E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y nε +
a
N
)
]
≥ B
}
and note that ηε ↓ 0 if ε ↓ 0.
Select ε > 0 such that ηε < δ. Then, for any 0 < β < δ − ηε we have
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y nε +
ηε + β
N
)
]
≥ B,
and
∑N
n=1(Y
n
ε +
ηε+β
N
) ≤ A + ηε + β < A + δ. As (Y
n
ε +
ηε+β
N
) ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ, we obtain a
contradiction.
(b) The implication B = π˜A(X)⇒ A = ρ˜B(X) follows exactly in the same way of the
implication (⇒) in (a), replacing MΦ with L1(P;QX).
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(c) Suppose that there exists Y ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ that is the optimal solution of problem
(1.4). As A := ρB(X), then
∑N
n=1 Y
n = A and the constraint in problem (1.6) is fulfilled
for Y. By (a), B = πA(X) ≥ E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B and we deduce that Y is an
optimal solution of problem (1.6). Suppose that there exists Y ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ that is the
optimal solution of problem (1.6) and set B := πA(X). Then E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
= B
and the constraint in problem (1.4) is fulfilled for Y. By (a), A = ρB(X) ≤
∑N
n=1 Y
n ≤ A
and we deduce that Y is an optimal solution of problem (1.4). As ρB(X) admits at most
one solution by Proposition 2.4, the same must be true for πA(X).
Proposition 4.2. (a) B = πQA (X) if and only if A = ρ
Q
B (X). (b) If B = π˜
Q
A (X) then
A = ρ˜QB (X), similarly for π̂
Q
A and ρ̂
Q
B . (c) When A = ρ
Q
B (X) and B = π
Q
A (X), and there
exists an optimal solution of one of the two problems πQA (X) or ρ
Q
B (X), then it is the unique
optimal solution of both problems. (d) In item (c) we may replace πQA , ρ
Q
B with π˜
Q
A , ρ˜
Q
B or
with π̂QA , ρ̂
Q
B .
Proof. Use step by step the same arguments in the proof of Proposition 4.1 replacing∑N
n=1 Y
n with
∑N
n=1 EQn[Y
n]. The uniqueness in Item (c) is a consequence of Remark
4.9.
When using Q = QX, we already proved that ρB(X) = ρ
QX
B (X). Similarly:
Corollary 4.3. Let A := ρB(X). Then πA(X) = π
QX
A (X).
Proof. As A = ρB(X) ∈ R, then by Proposition 3.3 A = ρB(X) = ρ
QX
B (X). By Proposition
4.1 (a), respectively Proposition 4.2 (a), we deduce: B = πA(X), resp. B = π
QX
A (X), hence
πA(X) = π
QX
A (X).
4.2 On the optimal values
The main contribution of this section is to show that the optimal values coincide, see (4.9)
and (4.10), and that, see (4.12)
πQA (X) = max∑N
n=1 a
n=A
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n), A ∈ R,
where
Un(a
n) := sup
{
E [un(X
n +W )] |W ∈Mφn , EQn [W ] ≤ a
n
}
(4.3)
and a ∈RN . In the sequel we write UQnn (an), when we need to emphasize the dependence on
Qn. Note that E[un(X
n+W )] ≤ un(E[X
n+W ]) < +∞ for all Xn,W ∈Mφn ⊆ L1(P;R).
The conditions Xn,W ∈Mφn imply that E[un(X
n+W )] > −∞, from which it follows that
Un(a
n) > −∞. As dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
, then W ∈Mφn implies W ∈ L1(Qn) and the problem (4.3)
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is well posed. Due to the monotonicity and concavity of un, Un is monotone increasing,
concave and continuous on R and we may replace, in the definition of Un, the inequality
with the equality sign. However, in general the optimal solution to (4.3) will only exist on
a larger domain, as suggested by the well known result reported in Proposition A.6. This
leads to introduce the auxiliary problems:
Ûn(a
n) : = sup
{
E [un(X
n +W )] | W ∈ L1(Qn), EQn [W ] ≤ a
n
}
,
U˜n(a
n) : = sup
{
E [un(X
n +W )] | W ∈ L1(P, Qn), EQn [W ] ≤ a
n
}
, (4.4)
where L1(P, Qn) is defined as in (4.1). The following proposition is the multi-dimensional
version of well known utility maximization problems. Its proof is based on the extended
Namioka-Klee Theorem and is deferred to the Apppendix A.4.
Proposition 4.4. We have that
Un(a
n) = U˜n(a
n) = Ûn(a
n) < +∞. (4.5)
If Un(a
n) < un(+∞) then
Un : R→ R is differentiable, Un(−∞) = −∞, U
′
n > 0, U
′
n(−∞) = +∞, U
′
n(+∞) = 0
(4.6)
and
Un(a
n) = inf
λ>0
{
λ (EQn [X
n] + an) + E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]}
. (4.7)
We now show that the optimal values are the same.
Lemma 4.5. Let A := ρQB (X) and π
Q
A (X) < +∞. Then
πQA (X) = sup
Y∈MΦ
{
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
|
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] = A
}
:= πQ,=A (X) (4.8)
and
πQA (X) = sup∑N
n=1 a
n=A
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n) = π˜QA (X) = π̂
Q
A (X), (4.9)
ρQB (X) = ρ˜
Q
B (X) = ρ̂
Q
B (X). (4.10)
Proof. Clearly, +∞ > πQA (X) ≥ π
Q,=
A (X). By contradiction suppose that π
Q
A (X) >
πQ,=A (X) and take ε > 0 such that π
Q
A (X) − ε > π
Q,=
A (X). By definition of π
Q
A (X) there
exists Y ∈MΦ satisfying
∑N
n=1 EQn [Y
n] < A and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
> πQA (X) − ε.
Take Y˜ n = Y n + δ , δ ∈ R+, such that
∑N
n=1 EQn
[
Y˜ n
]
= A. Then πQ,=A (X) ≥
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E[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y˜ n)
]
≥ E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
> πQA (X) − ε > π
Q,=
A (X), a contra-
diction. Hence (4.8) holds true. Note that
MΦ =
{
Y = a+ Z | a ∈RN and Z ∈MΦ such that EQn [Z
n] = 0 for each n
}
.
Indeed, just take Y ∈MΦ and let an := EQn [Y
n] ∈ R and Zn := Y n − an ∈Mφn . Then
πQA (X) = sup
Y∈MΦ
{
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
|
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] = A
}
= sup
∑N
n=1 a
n=A, Zn∈Mφn , EQn [Zn]=0 ∀n
{
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + an + Zn)
]}
= sup
∑N
n=1 a
n=A
N∑
n=1
sup
Y n∈Mφn , EQn [Y n]=an
E [un(X
n + Y n)] = sup
∑N
n=1 a
n=A
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n),
(4.11)
which shows the first equality in (4.9). Then πQA (X) = π˜
Q
A (X) = π̂
Q
A (X) are consequences
of (4.5) and the decompositions analogous to the one just obtained for πQA (X) in (4.11). Set
A := ρQB (X) > −∞ then B = π
Q
A (X), by Proposition 4.2 item (a). Hence B = π
Q
A (X) =
π˜QA (X) = π̂
Q
A (X) and, from Proposition 4.2 item (b), we obtain A := ρ˜
Q
B (X) = ρ̂
Q
B (X)
hence (4.10).
Proposition 4.6. Let A := ρQB (X) and π
Q
A (X) < +∞. There exists an optimal solution
a∗ ∈ RN to problem (4.9), namely
πQA (X) = max
a∈RN s.t.
∑N
n=1 a
n=A,
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n) =
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n
∗ ) and
N∑
n=1
an∗ = A. (4.12)
Proof. Let am = (a
1
m, · · · , a
N
m)m∈N be the approximating sequence of the supremum in
(4.12). Then
∑N
n=1 Un(a
n
m) ≥ π
Q
A (X) − δ := C and
∑N
n=1 a
n
m = A for each m. Then
(4.12) is a consequence of the continuity of Un and of Lemma 4.7, which guarantees that
am belongs to a compact set in R
N .
Lemma 4.7. For arbitrary constant A, B ∈ R set
K :=
{
a ∈ RN |
N∑
n=1
an ≤ A,
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n) ≥ B
}
.
Then K is a bounded closed set in RN .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We now turn our attention to the uniqueness of the optimal solution to the problem (3.2).
The proof is in Appendix A.4 and employs the same arguments used in the proof of
Proposition 2.4.
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Lemma 4.8. The penalty function can be written as
αB(Q) = sup
Z∈MΦ
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−Z
n] |
N∑
n=1
E[un(Z
n)] = B
}
= sup
Z∈L1(P;Q)
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−Z
n] | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(Z
n)
]
≥ B
}
, (4.13)
and there exists at most one Z ∈L1(P;Q) satisfying
αB(Q) =
N∑
n=1
EQn[−Z
n] and
N∑
n=1
E[un(Z
n)] ≥ B. (4.14)
Remark 4.9. From (4.10) and (3.5) we have
ρ̂QB (X) = ρ˜
Q
B (X) = ρ
Q
B (X) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn[X
n]− αB(Q).
Hence with a proof similar to the one of Lemma 4.8, we may replace the inequality with
an equality sign in the budget constraint in the definition of ρQB (X), ρ˜
Q
B (X) and ρ̂
Q
B (X),
and show the uniqueness of the optimizer Y in ρQB (X), ρ˜
Q
B (X) and ρ̂
Q
B (X).
4.3 On the optimal solution of ρ̂Q and comparison of optimal solutions
Theorem 4.10. Suppose that αB(Q) < +∞. Then the random vector ŶQ given by
Ŷ nQ := −X
n − v′n
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
)
,
where λ∗ is the unique solution to (3.9), satisfies Ŷ nQ ∈ L
1(Qn), un(X
n + Ŷ nQ) ∈ L
1(P),
E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Ŷ nQ)
]
= B and
ρQB (X) = inf
Y∈MΦ
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
=
N∑
n=1
EQn
[
Ŷ nQ
]
(4.15)
= min
Y∈L1(Q)
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [Y
n] | E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
:= ρ̂QB (X), (4.16)
so that ŶQ is the optimal solution for ρ̂
Q
B (X).
Proof. Note that ρQB (X) > −∞, as αB(Q) < +∞. The integrability conditions hold
thanks to the results stated in Appendix A.3. From (3.5) and the expression (3.8) for the
penalty, we compute
ρQB (X) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn [X
n]− αB(Q) =
=
N∑
n=1
EQn
[
−Xn − v′n
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
)]
=
N∑
n=1
EQn
[
Ŷ nQ
]
.
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We show that Ŷ nQ satisfies the budget constraint:
N∑
n=1
E
[
un
(
Xn + Ŷ nQ
)]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
un
(
−v′n
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
))]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
)]
− λ∗
N∑
n=1
EQn
[
v′n
(
λ∗
dQn
dP
)]
= B
due to u(−v′(y)) = v(y) − yv′(y) by Lemma A.5 and (3.9). Finally, ρQB (X) = ρ̂
Q
B (X)
follows from (4.10), and the Remark 4.9 implies uniqueness.
When both solutions to the problems ρB(X) and ρ
QX
B (X) exist, then they coincide.
Proposition 4.11. Let YX ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ be the optimal allocation for ρB(X), QX be an
optimal solution to the dual problem (3.1). Then YX = ŶQX , i.e.,
Y nX = Ŷ
n
QX
:= −Xn − v′n
(
λ∗
dQnX
dP
)
.
Proof. Note that YX satisfies
E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y nX)
]
≥ B, (4.17)
N∑
n=1
Y nX = ρB(X), (4.18)
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y nX] ≤
N∑
n=1
Y nX, (4.19)
as YX ∈ C and QX ∈ D. From (4.15), (3.5), (3.4) and (4.18) we deduce that
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Ŷ nQX ] = ρ
QX
B (X) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Xn]− αB(QX) = ρB(X) =
N∑
n=1
Y nX. (4.20)
As YX satisfies (4.17), by definition of ρ
QX
B (X) we have
N∑
n=1
Y nX = ρB(X) = ρ
QX
B (X) ≤
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y nX],
which shows, together with (4.19), that
N∑
n=1
Y nX =
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y nX]. (4.21)
From (4.20) and (4.21) we then deduce
αB(QX) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[
Xn + Ŷ nQX
]
, and
αB(QX) = −
N∑
n=1
(
EQn
X
[Xn] + Y nX
)
= −
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Xn + Y nX] .
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As both (X+YX) and (X+ ŶQX) satisfy the budget constraints associated to αB(QX) in
equation (4.14), this implies that αB(QX) is attained by both (X+YX) and (X+ ŶQX).
The uniqueness shown in Lemma 4.8 allows us to conclude that YX = ŶQX .
Remark 4.12. (On YX = ŶQX) In Theorem 4.19 we will prove the existence of Y˜X ∈
C0∩L
1(P,QX) which satisfies (4.17), (4.18) and (4.19) with Y˜X at the place of YX. Then
the above proof shows that Y˜X = ŶQX . Similarly, Corollary 4.13 also holds for such
Y˜X ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P,QX).
We now show that the maximizer of the dual representation is unique.
Corollary 4.13. Suppose that there exists an optimal allocation YX to ρB(X). Then the
optimal solution QX = (Q
1
X, · · · , Q
N
X) of the dual problem (3.1) is unique.
Proof. Suppose that Q1 and Q2 are two optimizers of the dual problem (3.1). Then
αB(Q1) < +∞, αB(Q2) < +∞ and, by Proposition 4.11 and Remark 4.12, we have for
each n :
−Xn − v′n
(
λ∗1
dQn1
dP
)
= Ŷ nQ1 = Y
n
X = Ŷ
n
Q2
= −Xn − v′n
(
λ∗2
dQn2
dP
)
, P a.s.
As v′n is invertible, we conclude that λ
∗
1
dQn1
dP
= λ∗2
dQn2
dP
, P a.s., which then implies Qn1 = Q
n
2 ,
as E
[
dQn1
dP
]
= E
[
dQn2
dP
]
= 1.
4.4 On the existence of the optimal allocation for ρ˜B
4.4.1 A first step
We first show that ρB reaches its infimum for Y ∈ L
1(P;RN ).
Theorem 4.14. For C ⊆ CR ∩M
Φ and for any X ∈MΦ there exists Y ∈ L1(P;RN ) such
that
N∑
n=1
Y n ∈ R, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n+Y n)
]
≥ B,
ρB(X) := inf
{
N∑
n=1
Zn | Z ∈ C, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n+Zn)
]
≥ B
}
=
N∑
n=1
Y n,
and a sequence {Yk}k∈N ⊂ C such that E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n+Y nk )
]
≥ B and
Yk → Y P-a.s.
Remark 4.15. We note that the random vectorY in Theorem 4.14 satisfies all the conditions
for being the optimal allocation for ρB(X), except for the integrability condition Y ∈M
Φ,
which is replaced by Y ∈ L1(P;RN ). Furthermore Y = limk {Yk}, P-a.s., for Yk ∈
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C0 ∩M
Φ. If we assume that C0 is closed in L
0(P), which is a reasonable assumption and
holds true if C = C(n), in which case C
(n)
0 is defined in (2.6), then Y would also belong
to C0, but in general not to C (as M
Φ is in general not closed for P-a.s. convergence).
A special case is when the cardinality of Ω is finite and the set C is closed for the P-a.s.
convergence: under these assumptions Y belongs to C and Y = YX = ŶQX . In Section
4.4.2 we will show when Y also belongs to C0 ∩ L
1(QX;R
N ).
Proof. Take a sequence of vectors (Vk)k∈N ∈ C ⊆ CR ∩M
Φ ⊆ L1(P;RN ) such that R ∋
ck :=
∑N
n=1 V
n
k ↓ ρB(X) as k → +∞ and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n+V nk )
]
≥ B. The sequence
(Vk)k∈N is bounded for the L
1(P;RN ) norm if and only if so is the sequence (X+Vk)k∈N.
Given the following decomposition in positive and negative part
N∑
n=1
E[|Xn+V nk |] =
N∑
n=1
E[(Xn+V nk )
+] +
N∑
n=1
E[(Xn+V nk )
−], (4.22)
we define the index sets:
N+∞ =
{
n ∈ {1, ..., N} | lim sup
k→+∞
E[(Xn+V nk )
+] = +∞
}
,
N+b =
{
n ∈ {1, ..., N} | lim sup
k→+∞
E[(Xn+V nk )
+] < +∞
}
,
and, similarly, N−∞ and N
−
b for the negative part. We can split the expression (4.22) as∑
n∈N+∞
EP[(X
n+V nk )
+]+
∑
n∈N+
b
EP[(X
n+V nk )
+]+
∑
n∈N−∞
EP[(X
n+V nk )
−]+
∑
n∈N−
b
EP[(X
n+V nk )
−].
If the sequence (X+Vk)k∈N is not L
1(P;RN ) -bounded, then one of the sets N+∞ or N
−
∞
must be nonempty and therefore, because of the constraint
∑N
n=1 V
n
k = ck, both N
+
∞ and
N−∞ must be nonempty. From Lemma A.1 (a), by Jensen inequality and (4.2) we obtain
B ≤
N∑
n=1
E[un(X
n+V nk )] ≤
N∑
n=1
un (E[X
n+V nk ])
=
N∑
n=1
un
(
E[(Xn+V nk )
+]
)
+
N∑
n=1
un
(
−E[(Xn+V nk )
−]
)
≤ b
 ∑
n∈N+∞
E[(Xn+V nk )
+] +
∑
n∈N+
b
E[(Xn+V nk )
+]

−2b
 ∑
n∈N−∞
E[(Xn+V nk )
−] +
∑
n∈N−
b
E[(Xn+V nk )
−]
+ const
= b
(
ck +
N∑
n=1
E[Xn]
)
+ const− b
 ∑
n∈N−∞
E[(Xn+V nk )
−] +
∑
n∈N−
b
E[(Xn+V nk )
−]

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which is a contradiction, as the second term that multiplies b in not bounded from above.
Hence we exclude that our minimizing sequence (Vk)k∈N has unbounded L
1(P;RN ) norm
and we may apply a Komlós compactness argument, as stated in Theorem 1.4 [22]. Ap-
plying this result to the sequence (Vk)k∈N ∈ C, we can find a sequence Yk ∈ conv(Vi, i ≥
k) ∈ C, as C is convex, such that Yk converges P-a.s. to Y ∈ L
1(P;RN ).
Observe that by construction
∑N
n=1 Y
n
k is P-a.s. a real number and, as a consequence,
so is
∑N
n=1 Y
n. As E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n+V nk )
]
≥ B, also the Yk satisfy such constraint and
therefore ρB(X) ≤
∑N
n=1 Y
n
k .
Let Yk =
∑
i∈Jk
λkiVi ∈ conv(Vi, i ≥ k), for some finite convex combination (λ
k
i )i∈Jk
such that λki > 0 and
∑
i∈Jk
λki = 1, where Jk is a finite subset of {k, k + 1, ...} . For any
fixed k we compute
N∑
n=1
Y nk =
N∑
n=1
∑
i∈Jk
λki V
n
i

j
=
∑
i∈Jk
λki
(
N∑
n=1
V ni
)
=
∑
i∈Jk
λki ci ≤ ck
∑
i∈Jk
λki
 = ck (4.23)
and from ρB(X) ≤
∑N
n=1 Y
n
k ≤ ck, we then deduce that
∑N
n=1 Y
n = ρB(X).
We now show that Y also satisfies the budget constraint. In case that all utility
functions are bounded from above, this is an immediate consequence of Fatou Lemma,
since
N∑
n=1
E[−un(X
n+Y n)] =
N∑
n=1
E[limk→∞ (−un(X
n+Y nk ))]
≤ limk→∞
N∑
n=1
E[−un(X
n+Y nk )] ≤ B.
In the general case, recall first that the sequence Vk is bounded in L
1(P;RN ), and the
argument used in (4.23) shows that
‖ X+Yk ‖1≤‖ X ‖1 + sup
k
‖ Vk ‖1,
hence supk ‖ X+Yk ‖1<∞.
We now need to exploit the Inada condition at +∞. Applying the Lemma A.1 (b) to the
utility functions un, assumed null in 0, we get
−un(x) + εx
+ + b(ε) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ R.
Replacing X+Y in the expression above, applying Fatou Lemma we have
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E[
N∑
n=1
−un(X
n+Y n) + ε(Xn+Y n)+ + b(ε)
]
= E
[
limk→∞
(
N∑
n=1
−un(X
n+Y nk ) + ε(X
n+Y nk )
+ + b(ε)
)]
≤ limk→∞
N∑
n=1
E
[
−un(X
n+Y nk ) + ε(X
n+Y nk )
+ + b(ε)
]
≤ −B + ε
(
sup
k
‖ X+Yk ‖1
)
+ b(ε).
As the term b(ε) simplifies in the above inequality, we conclude that for all ε > 0
E
[
N∑
n=1
−un(X
n+Y n)
]
≤ −B + ε
(
sup
k
‖ X+Yk ‖1 −
N∑
n=1
E
[
(Xn+Y n)+
])
,
and since supk ‖ X+Yk ‖1<∞ we obtain
E
[
N∑
n=1
−un(X
n+Y n)
]
≤ −B,
so that Y satisfies the constraint.
4.4.2 Second Step: The optimal allocation in L1(QX)
We now prove further integrability properties of the random vector Y in Theorem 4.14.
Lemma 4.16. The random vector Y in Theorem 4.14 satisfies Y−∈L1(QX).
Proof. Applying (4.2) and φj(x) := −uj(−|x|), note that for each fixed 1 ≤ j ≤ N
0 ≤ E
[
φj((X
j + Y j)−)
]
≤
N∑
n=1
E
[
φn((X
n + Y n)−)
]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
−un(−(X
n + Y n)−)
]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
un(X
n + Y n)+
]
−
N∑
n=1
E [un(X
n + Y n)]
≤
N∑
n=1
un
(
E
[
(Xn + Y n)+
])
−B <∞,
where we used Jensen inequality and X+Y ∈ L1(P;RN ). This yields (Xj+Y j)− ∈ Lφj ⊆
L1(QjX). From Y
j = (Xj + Y j)+ − (Xj + Y j)− −Xj ≥ −(Xj + Y j)− −Xj we get
0 ≤ (Y j)− ≤ (−(Xj + Y j)− −Xj)− = ((Xj + Y j)− +X)+.
Since, by assumption, Xj ∈Mφj ⊆ L1(QjX), then also ((X
j +Y j)−+Xj)+ ∈ L1(QjX) and
so
(Y j)− ∈ L1(QjX), 1 ≤ j ≤ N.
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Lemma 4.17. The random vector Y in Theorem 4.14 satisfies Y+∈L1(QX).
Proof. We proved in Theorem 4.14 the existence of Y satisfying ρB(X) =
∑N
n=1 Y
n ∈ R
with Y ∈ L1(P;RN ), E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n+Y n)
]
≥ B and Y is the P-a.s. limit of a sequence
{Yk}k in C ⊆ CR∩M
Φ such that
∑N
n=1 Y
n
k → ρB(X), as k ↑ +∞,
∑N
n=1 E [un(X
n + Y nk )] ≥
B and
∑N
n=1 EQ
n
X
[Y nk ] ≤
∑N
n=1 Y
n
k . By passing to a subsequence, w.l.o.g we may assume∑N
n=1 Y
n
k ↓ ρB(X). Let j ∈ {1, ..., N}. By Fatou’s Lemma we get
E
Q
j
X
[(Y j)+] ≤ limkEQj
X
[(Y jk )
+] ≤ sup
k
E
Q
j
X
[Y jk ] + sup
k
E
Q
j
X
[(Y jk )
−]. (4.24)
First we show that supk EQj
X
[Y jk ] < ∞. Put a
n
k = EQnX[Y
n
k ]. Then
∑N
n=1 a
n
k ≤ A˜ :=∑N
n=1 Y
n
k ≤
∑N
n=1 Y
n
1 and
∑N
n=1 U
QnX
n (ank) ≥
∑N
n=1 E [un(X
n + Y nk )] ≥ B for all k ∈ N.
Thus by Lemma 4.7, {ak}k∈N lies in a bounded set in R
N and thus
sup
k
E
Q
j
X
[Y jk ] <∞. (4.25)
Next we show supk EQj
X
[(Y jk )
−] <∞. For all k ∈ N it holds that
0 ≤ E
[
φj((X
j + Y jk )
−)
]
≤
N∑
n=1
E
[
φn((X
n + Y nk )
−)
]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
−un(−(X
n + Y nk )
−)
]
=
N∑
n=1
E
[
un(X
n + Y nk )
+
]
−
N∑
n=1
E [un(X
n + Y nk )] ≤
N∑
n=1
un
(
E
[
(Xn + Y nk )
+
])
−B,
where we used the fact that Yk satisfies the constraint
∑N
n=1 E [un(X
n + Y nk )] > B and
Jensen inequality. From the proof of Theorem 4.14 we know that (Xn + Y nk )k∈N is L
1(P)-
bounded for all n = 1, ..., N , and thus
0 ≤ sup
k
E
[
φj((X
j + Y jk )
−)
]
≤
N∑
n=1
un
(
sup
k
E
[
(Xn + Y nk )
+
])
−B <∞ .
By Remark 2.1 it then follows that (Xj + Y jk )
−
k∈N is L
1(QjX)-bounded. From Y
j
k = (X
j +
Y jk )
+ − (Xj + Y jk )
− −Xj ≥ −(Xj + Y jk )
− −Xj we get
0 ≤ (Y jk )
− ≤ (−(Xj + Y jk )
− −Xj)− = ((Xj + Y jk )
− +Xj)+,
and thus
sup
k
E
Q
j
X
[(Y jk )
−] ≤ sup
k
E
Q
j
X
[(Xj + Y jk )
−] + E
Q
j
X
[|Xj |] <∞ , (4.26)
where we recall that by assumption Xj ∈Mφj ⊆ L1(QjX). From (4.25) and (4.26) together
with (4.24) the claim follows.
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4.4.3 The Final Step
For our final result on the existence we need one more assumption.
Definition 4.18. We say that C0 is closed under truncation if for each Y ∈ C0 there exists
mY ∈ N and cY = (c
1
Y , ..., c
N
Y ) ∈ R
N such that
∑N
n=1 c
n
Y =
∑N
n=1 Y
n := cY ∈ R and for all
m ≥ mY
Ym := YI{∩Nn=1{|Y n|<m}}
+ cY I{∪Nn=1{|Y n|≥m}}
∈ C0. (4.27)
Note that in Definition 2.6, the set C
(n)
0 is closed under truncation.
Theorem 4.19. Let C = C0∩M
Φ and suppose that C0 ⊆ CR is closed for the convergence in
probability and closed under truncation. For any X ∈MΦ there exists Y˜X ∈ C0∩L
1(P;QX)
such that
N∑
n=1
Y˜ nX ∈ R, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n+Y˜ nX)
]
≥ B,
N∑
n=1
(
EQn
X
[
Y˜ nX
]
− Y˜ nX
)
= 0,
and
ρB(X) = inf
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n+Y n)
]
≥ B
}
=
N∑
n=1
Y˜ nX
= min
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX), E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n+Y n)
]
≥ B
}
:= ρ˜B(X),
(4.28)
so that Y˜X is the optimal solution to the extended problem ρ˜B(X).
Proof. The optimal solution Y˜X coincides with the vector Y in Theorem 4.14, which
belongs to L1(P;QX), by Theorem 4.14, Lemma 4.16, Lemma 4.17, and to C0, as C0
is closed for the convergence in probability and Y = limmYm P-a.s. and (Ym) ⊂ C0.
Comparing Theorem 4.19 with Theorem 4.14 we see that it remains to prove ρB = ρ˜B and∑N
n=1
(
EQn
X
[
Y˜ nX
]
− Y˜ nX
)
≤ 0: this is done in Proposition 4.22 and Proposition 4.20 and
requires the truncation assumption on C0. The opposite inequality
N∑
n=1
Y˜ nX = ρB(X) = ρ
QX
B (X) ≤
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[
Y˜ nX
]
holds as Y˜X fulfills the budget constraints of ρ
QX
B (X).
Proposition 4.20. Suppose that C0 is closed under truncation. Then
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y n] ≤
N∑
n=1
Y n, for all Y ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(QX;R
N ).
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Proof. Let Y ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(QX;R
N ) and consider Ym for m ∈ N as defined in (4.27), where
w.l.o.g. we assume mY = 1. Note that
∑N
n=1 Y
n
m = cY (=
∑N
n=1 Y
n) for all m ∈ N. By
boundedness of Ym and (4.27), we have Ym ∈ C0 ∩M
Φ for all m ∈ N. Further, Ym → Y
QX-a.s. for m→∞ , and thus, since |Ym| ≤ max{|Y|, |cY |} ∈ L
1(QX;R
N ) for all m ∈ N,
also Ym → Y in L
1(QX;R
N ) for m→∞ by dominated convergence. We then obtain
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y n] = lim
m→∞
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y nm] ≤ lim
m→∞
N∑
n=1
Y nm = cY =
N∑
n=1
Y n.
The map ρ˜B is defined on M
Φ but the admissible claims Y belongs to the set C0 ∩
L1(P;QX), not included in M
Φ. As L1(P;QX) ⊆ L
1(P;RN ) with the same argument
used in the proof of Proposition 2.4, we can show that ρ˜B(X) > −∞ for all X ∈M
Φ.
By the same argument in the proof of Proposition 2.4 and by (2.3) we also deduce that
ρ˜B(X) < +∞ for all X ∈M
Φ, so that
ρ˜B : M
Φ → R
is convex and monotone decreasing on its domain dom(ρ˜) = MΦ. From Theorem A.2, we
then know that the penalty functions of ρB and ρ˜B are defined as:
αB(Q) : = sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−X
n]− ρB(X) | X ∈M
Φ
}
,
α˜B(Q) : = sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−X
n]− ρ˜B(X) | X ∈M
Φ
}
.
Lemma 4.21. If C0 is closed under truncation, then α˜B(QX) = αB(QX).
Proof. In the proof, we will suppress the labelB from the penalty functions. Set E [Λ(X+ Z)] =
E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n+Zn)
]
. We then have that
α˜(QX) = sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]− ρ˜B(X) | X ∈M
Φ
}
= sup
X∈MΦ
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn] + sup
{
−
N∑
n=1
Zn | Z ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX), E [Λ(X+ Z)] ≥ B
}}
= sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]−
N∑
n=1
Zn | Z ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX), X ∈M
Φ, E [Λ(X+ Z)] ≥ B
}
≤ sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]−
N∑
n=1
Zn | Z ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX), X ∈ L
1(P;QX), E [Λ(X+ Z)] ≥ B
}
= sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Wn] +
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Zn]−
N∑
n=1
Zn | Z ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX), W ∈ L
1(P;QX), E [Λ(W)] ≥ B
}
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= sup
W∈L1(P;QX)
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Wn] | E [Λ(W)] ≥ B
}
+ sup
{
N∑
n=1
(
EQn
X
[Zn]− Zn
)
| Z ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX)
}
≤ sup
W∈L1(P;QX)
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Wn] | E [Λ(W)] ≥ B
}
= α(QX),
because
∑N
n=1
(
EQn
X
[Zn]− Zn
)
≤ 0 for all Z ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX) ⊆ C0 ∩ L
1(QX,R
N ), as
shown in Proposition 4.20. The last equality follows from (4.13).
The opposite inequality is trivial, as ρ˜B ≤ ρB implies
α˜(QX) = sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]− ρ˜B(X) | X ∈M
Φ
}
≥ sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]− ρB(X) | X ∈M
Φ
}
= α(QX).
Proposition 4.22. If C0 is closed under truncation, then
ρB(X) = ρ˜B(X) = inf
Y∈L1(P;QX)
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C0, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n+Y n)
]
≥ B
}
. (4.29)
Proof. We know that ρ˜B : M
Φ → R is convex and monotone decreasing. By definition,
ρ˜B ≤ ρB . Under the truncation assumption, Lemma 4.21 shows that α˜B(QX) = αB(QX).
Then, by Theorem A.2,
ρ˜B(X) = sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−X
n]− α˜B(Q) |
dQ
dP
∈ LΦ
∗
}
≥
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]− α˜B(QX)
=
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−Xn]− αB(QX) = ρB(X).
Corollary 4.23. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 4.19, the following holds true:
ρB(X) = ρ
QX
B (X) = ρ˜
QX
B (X) = ρ̂
QX
B (X) = ρ˜B(X), (4.30)
πA(X) = π
QX
A (X) = π˜
QX
A (X) = π̂
QX
A (X), (4.31)
for A := ρB(X), and the unique optimal solutions to the extended problems ρ˜
QX
B (X),
ρ̂QXB (X), ρ˜B(X), and π̂
QX
A (X), π˜
QX
A (X) exist and coincide with
Y˜X = ŶQX =
(
−Xn − v′n
(
λ∗
dQnX
dP
))
n
∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX),
and QX is the unique optimal solution to the dual problem (3.1).
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Proof. From (4.29), (4.10), (4.9), (3.6) and Corollary 4.3 we already know that (4.30) and
(4.31) hold true, when A := ρB(X). By Theorem 4.19 there exists an optimal solution
Y˜X ∈ C0 ∩ L
1(P;QX) to ρ˜B(X) and by Proposition 4.11 and Remark 4.12 it coincides
with the unique optimal solution ŶQX for ρ̂
QX
B (X). By 4.16, ρ˜
QX
B (X) = ρ̂
QX
B (X) =∑N
n=1 EQ
n
X
[
Ŷ nQX
]
and then ŶQX = Y˜X ∈ C0∩L
1(P;QX) proves that it is also the optimal
solution for ρ˜QXB (X). From (4.30) and (4.31), we know that B = π˜
QX
A (X) = π̂
QX
A (X) and
A = ρ˜QXB (X) = ρ̂
QX
B (X). Therefore, Proposition 4.2 (d) shows that Y˜X is the unique
optimal solution to π˜QXA (X) and π̂
QX
A (X).
5 Additional Properties of QX and Fair Risk Allocation
In this section we provide additional properties for the systemic risk measure ρ(X) given
by (1.4) and for the systemic risk allocations ρn(X) = EQn
X
[Y nX] , n = 1, ..., N, introduced
in (1.7). We argue that the choice of QX as the systemic vector of probability measures is
fair both from the point of view of the system and from the point of view of the individual
banks.
5.1 Cash additivity and marginal risk contribution
In this section we provide a sensitivity analysis of ρ(X) with respect to changes in the
positions X, which also shows the relevance of the dual optimizer QX. We first show that
ρ(X) is cash additive.
Lemma 5.1. Define WC := {Z ∈ CR | Y ∈ C ⇐⇒ Y − Z ∈ C} ∩M
Φ. Then, the risk mea-
sure ρ is cash additive on WC, i.e.,
ρ(X+ Z) = ρ(X)−
N∑
n=1
Zn for all Z ∈ WC and all X ∈M
Φ, (5.1)
and it satisfies
d
dε
ρ(X+εV)|ε=0 = −
N∑
n=1
V n , (5.2)
for all V such that εV ∈WC for all ε ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Let Z ∈ WC . Then, W := Z+Y ∈ C ⊆ CR for any Y ∈ C. For any X ∈ M
Φ we
have
ρ(X+ Z) = inf{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C, E[Λ(X+ Z+Y)] ≥ B}
= inf{
N∑
n=1
W n −
N∑
n=1
Zn |W ∈ C, E[Λ(X+W)] ≥ B} = ρ(X)−
N∑
n=1
Zn.
In particular, ρ(X+εV) = ρ(X)− ε
∑N
n=1 V
n for εV ∈WC and (5.2) follows.
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Example 5.2. In case of the set C(n) in Example 2.5, ρ is cash additive onWC(n) = C
(n) This
equality holds since we are assuming no restrictions on the vector d = (d, · · · , dm) ∈ R
m,
which determines the grouping.
Remark 5.3. Under Assumption 2.2 we have RN ⊆ WC and (5.2) holds for all V ∈ R
N .
The marginal risk contribution d
dε
ρ(X+εV)|ε=0 was also considered in [13] and [3] and
is an important quantity which describes the sensitivity of the risk of X with respect to
the impact V ∈L0(RN ). The property (5.2) cannot be immediately generalized to the case
of random vectors V as
∑N
n=1 V
n /∈ R in general. In the following, we obtain the general
local version of cash additivity, which extends (5.2) to a random setting.
Proposition 5.4. Let X and V ∈MΦ. Let QX be the optimal solution to the dual problem
(3.1) associated to ρ(X) and assume that ρ(X+εV) is differentiable with respect to ε at
ε = 0, and
dQX+εV
dP
→ dQX
dP
in σ∗(LΦ
∗
,MΦ), as ε→ 0. Then,
d
dε
ρ(X+εV)|ε=0 = −
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[V n]. (5.3)
Proof. As the penalty function αB does not depend on X, by (3.4) we deduce
d
dε
ρ(X+εV)|ε=0 =
d
dε
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X+εV
[−Xn−εV n]− αB(QX+εV)
}
|ε=0
=
d
dε
{
N∑
n=1
EQn
X+εV
[−Xn]− αB(QX+εV)
}
|ε=0
+
N∑
n=1
d
dε
(
εEQn
X+εV
[−V n]
)
|ε=0 (5.4)
= 0 +
N∑
n=1
lim
ε→0
EQn
X+εV
[−V n] =
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[−V n], (5.5)
where the equality between (5.4) and (5.5) is justified by the optimality of QX and the
differentiability of ρ(X+εV), while the last equality is guaranteed by the convergence of
dQX+εV
dP
.
Remark 5.5. We emphasize that the generalization (5.3) of (5.2) holds because we are
computing the expectation with respect to the vector QX and hints at the implementation
of the maximizer QX of the dual problem as explained in the following Sections. The
assumptions of Proposition 5.4 are satisfied in the case of the exponential utility functions,
which is considered in Section 6.
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5.2 Interpretation and implementation of ρ(X)
Going back to the definition (1.4) of ρ(X), once an aggregation function Λ, an acceptance
set A, and a class C ⊆ CR have been chosen, then ρ(X) represents the minimal total cash
amount needed to make the system acceptable at time T . For the sake of notation’s sim-
plicity, in the sequel we simply write YX for the solution of ρB(X), i.e., we do not specify
if we work with YX or Y˜X. As already mentioned in the Introduction and as a result of
Proposition 4.1, one relevant economic justification for ρ is that the optimal allocation YX
of ρ(X) maximizes the expected system utility among all random allocations of cost less
or equal to ρ(X).
We notice also that the class C may determine the level of risk sharing (as explained below
in (b)) between the banks, ranging from no risk sharing in the case of deterministic alloca-
tions C = RN , to the case of full risk sharing C = CR, and other constraints in between as
in the grouping Example 2.5. We now discuss two features of our systemic risk measure.
Implementation of the scenario-dependent allocation:
(a) In practice, the mechanism can be described as a default fund as in the case of a CCP
(see [3]). The amount ρ(X) would be collected at time 0 according to some systemic
risk allocation ρn(X) , n = 1, · · · , N, satisfying
∑N
n=1 ρ
n(X) = ρ(X). Then, at time
T , this exact same amount would be redistributed among the banks according to the
optimal scenario-dependent allocations Y nX’s satisfying
∑N
n=1 Y
n
X = ρ(X), so that the
fund acts as a clearing house.
(b) An alternative interpretation and implementation more in the spirit of monetary risk
measures is in terms of capital requirements together with a risk sharing mechanism.
Consider again a given systemic risk allocation ρn(X) , n = 1, · · · , N, At time 0,
a capital requirement ρn(X) is imposed on each bank n, n = 1, ..., N . Then, at
time T , a risk sharing mechanism takes place: each bank provides (if negative)
or collects (if positive) the amount Y nX − ρ
n(X). Note that in sum the financial
position of bank n at time T is Xn + ρn(X) + (Y nX − ρ
n(X)) = Xn+ Y nX as required.
Further, this risk sharing mechanism is made possible because of the clearing property∑N
n=1 (Y
n
X − ρ
n(X)) = 0 which follows from
∑N
n=1 Y
n
X = ρ(X) and the full risk
allocation requirement
∑N
n=1 ρ
n(X) = ρ(X). The incentive for a singe bank to enter
in such a mechanism will be made clear below after we introduce the choice of a fair
risk allocation in Section 5.3.
Total risk reduction and dependence structure of X
From a system-wide point of view, considering the optimal random allocation YX implies
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a reduction of the total amount needed to secure the system (compared with the optimal
deterministic allocation). This reduction is also a consequence of our framework of scenario-
dependent allocations that allows for taking into account the dependence structure of X.
An example showing these features can be found in Example 7.1 [7]. In the case of the
aggregation function Λ being a sum of utility functions as considered in this paper, one can
see directly that the dependence structure of X is taken into account from the constraint
E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B in (1.4), which depends only on the marginal distributions of
X in the case of deterministic Y n’s.
5.3 Fair systemic risk allocation ρn(X)
We now address the problem of choosing a systemic risk allocations (ρn(X))n ∈ R
N (or
individual contributions at time zero) as introduced in Definition 1.2. Note that in our
setting, besides providing a ranking of the institutions in terms of their systemic riski-
ness, a risk allocation ρn(X) can be interpreted as a capital contribution/requirement for
institution n in order to secure the system.
From (5.3) we see that EQX [·] defined by EQX [Y] =
∑N
n=1 EQ
n
X
[Y n] already appeared
as a multivariate valuation operator and, on the other hand, we have obtained in (4.21)
that the minimizer YX and the maximizer QX of the dual problem satisfy
ρ(X) =
N∑
n=1
Y nX =
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y nX],
which shows that
(
ρn(X))n = (EQn
X
[Y nX]
)
n
provides a systemic risk allocation.
Any vector of probability measures Q = (Qn)n gives rise to a valuation operator EQ[·]
and to the systemic risk measure ρQ given by (1.9). Note, however, that in (1.9) the clearing
condition
∑N
n=1 Y
n = ρ(X) is not guaranteed since the optimization is there performed
over all Y ∈MΦ. Now, using the valuation EQX [·] given by the dual optimizer we know by
Proposition 4.11 that the optimal allocation in (1.9) fulfills the clearing condition YX ∈ CR,
and is in fact the same as the optimal allocation for the original systemic risk measure in
(1.4). From (4.20) and (4.21) we obtain
N∑
n=1
Y nX = ρ(X) = ρ
QX(X) =
N∑
n=1
EQn
X
[Y nX], (5.6)
which shows that the valuation with EQX [·] is in line with the systemic risk measure ρ(X).
This supports the introduction of EQX [·] as a suitable systemic valuation operator.
The essential question for a financial institution is now whether its allocated share of the
total systemic risk determined by the risk allocation (EQ1
X
[Y 1X], · · · , (EQNX
[Y NX ]) is fair.
With the choice Q = QX, from Corollary 4.3, Lemma 4.5 and equation (4.12) we have
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πA(X) = π
QX
A (X) = max∑N
n=1 a
n=A,
N∑
n=1
sup
EQn
X
[Y n]=an
E [un(X
n + Y n)] . (5.7)
Choosing A = ρB(X), we obtain by Proposition 4.2 and the fact that, then, YX is the
optimal solution of πQXA (X), that EQXn [Y
n
X] = a
n
∗ ,
∑N
n=1 EQXn [Y
n
X] = A, and (5.7) can
be rewritten as
πA(X) = π
QX
A (X) =
N∑
n=1
sup
EQn
X
[Y n]=EQn
X
[Y n
X
]
E [un(X
n + Y n)] .
This means that by using QX for valuation, the system utility maximization in (1.8)
reduces to individual utility maximization problems for the banks without the “systemic”
constraint Y ∈ C:
∀n, sup
Y n
{
E [un(X
n + Y n)] | EQn
X
[Y n] = EQn
X
[Y nX]
}
.
The optimal allocation Y nX and its value EQnX [Y
n
X] can thus be considered fair by the
nth bank, as Y nX maximizes the individual expected utility of bank n among all random
allocations (not constrained to be in CR) with value EQn
X
[Y nX]. In particular, it is clear
then that for individual banks it is more advantageous to use random allocations than the
deterministic ρn as the supreme will be larger, as previoulsy stated in Section 5.2 (a) and
(b). This finally argues for the fairness of the risk allocation (EQ1
X
[Y 1X], · · · ,EQNX
[Y NX ]) as
fair valuation of the optimal scenario-dependent allocation (Y 1X, · · · , Y
N
X ).
6 The exponential case
In this section, we focus on a relevant case under Assumption 2.2, i.e., we set C = C(n),
see Examples 2.5 and 3.5, and we choose un(x) = −e
−αnx/αn, αn > 0, n = 1, · · · , N ,
as in Example 3.6. Then vn(y) =
1
αn
[y ln(y) − y], v′n(y) =
1
αn
ln(y). We select B <∑N
n=1 un(+∞) = 0. Under these assumptions, φn(x) := −un(−|x|) + un(0) =
1
αn
(eαn|x| −
1),
Mφn = M exp :=
{
X ∈ L0(R) | E[ec|X|] < +∞ for all c > 0
}
,
the Orlicz HeartsMφn , n = 1, · · · , N , coincide with the single Orlicz HeartM exp associated
to the exponential Young function x → e|x| − 1 and the random variable X :=
∑
nX
n ∈
M exp is well defined. The systemic risk measure (2.5) ρ : (M exp)N → R becomes
ρ(X) = inf
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ C(n), E
[
−
N∑
n=1
1
αn
exp [−αn(X
n + Y n)]
]
= B
}
. (6.1)
Recall that each set C(n) is closed in probability and closed by truncation. From Proposition
2.4 and Corollary 4.23 we deduce:
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Proposition 6.1. The map ρ in (6.1) is finitely valued, monotone decreasing, convex,
continuous and subdifferentiable on the Orlicz Heart MΦ = (M exp)N , and the problem
ρ˜(X) admits the unique optimal solution Y˜X given in Corollary 4.23.
For a given partition n and allocations C(n) we can explicitly compute the optimal
value ρ(X), the unique optimal allocation of (6.1) and the unique optimizer QX of the
corresponding dual problem (3.10). Notice that in this exponential case Y˜X = YX ∈
(M exp)N is the optimal solution for ρ(X) and for ρ˜(X).
Theorem 6.2. For m = 1, · · · , h, and for k ∈ Im we have:
dm = βm log
(
−
β
B
E
[
exp
(
−
Xm
βm
)])
, (6.2)
Y km = −X
k +
1
βmαk
Xm +
1
βmαk
dm ∈M
exp, (6.3)
where Xm =
∑
k∈Im
Xk, βm =
∑
k∈Im
1
αk
, β =
∑N
i=1
1
αi
, and
ρ(X) =
N∑
i=1
Y i =
h∑
m=1
dm.
The vector QX of probability measures with densities
dQmX
dP
:=
e
− 1
βm
Xm
E
[
e−
1
βm
Xm
] m = 1, · · · , h. (6.4)
is the optimal solution of the dual problem (3.10), i.e.,
ρ(X) =
h∑
m=1
EQm
X
[−Xm]− αB(QX), (6.5)
and EQm
X
[Y nX], m = 1, · · · , h, n ∈ Im, is a systemic risk allocation, as in Definition 1.1.
Proof. By (3.11) we note that QX, defined in (6.4), belongs to D. Using QX and selecting,
from Example 3.6, λ∗ = −B
β
, it is easy to verify that the random variable Y nX := −X
n −
v′n
(
λ∗
dQnX
dP
)
assigned in Corollary 4.23 coincides with the expression in (6.3) and
∑
n∈Im
Y nX =
dm. We prove below that
∑h
m=1 dm =
∑h
m=1 EQ
m
X
[
−Xm
]
− αB(QX). A priori these
equations would not be sufficient to prove that (YX,QX) were indeed the optimal solutions
to the primal and dual problems, as one needs to know that one of the two is indeed an
optimizer of the corresponding problem.
The proofs that YX defined in (6.3) is the optimizer of ρ(X), uses the Lagrange’s
method and several estimates of lengthy computations and is omitted2.
2The proof can be obtained upon request from the authors.
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We now prove (6.5). First notice that:
H (QmX,P) = EQmX
[
ln
(
dQmX
dP
)]
=
1
βm
EQm
X
[
−Xm
]
− lnE
[
e
− 1
βm
Xm
]
. (6.6)
By (3.13), αB(QX) can be rewritten as
αB(QX) =
h∑
m=1
∑
i∈Im
{
1
αi
H (QmX,P) +
1
αi
ln
(
−
B
β
)}
=
h∑
m=1
(
EQm
X
[
−Xm
]
− βm ln
(
−
β
B
E
[
e−
1
βm
Xm
]))
=
h∑
m=1
(
EQm
X
[
−Xm
]
− dm
)
=
h∑
m=1
EQm
X
[
−Xm
]
− ρ(X),
as ρ(X) =
∑N
i=1 Y
i =
∑h
m=1 dm. Then (3.12) concludes the proof.
Remark 6.3. Note that if we arbitrarily change the components of the vector X, but keep
fixed the components in one given subgroup, say Im0 , then the risk measure ρ(X) will of
course change, but dm0 and Y
k
m0
for k ∈ Im0 remain the same.
6.1 Sensitivity analysis
Let X ∈(M exp)N , V ∈(M exp)N and set V m :=
∑
k∈Im
Vk, for m = 1, · · · , h. We consider
a perturbation εV, ε ∈ R, and perform a sensitivity analysis in the exponential case.
Consider the optimal allocations Y iX+εV and the optimal solution QX+εV of the dual
problem associated to ρ(X+ εV), see (6.4). By (6.3) and (6.2) we have
Y nX+εV = −X
n − εV n +
1
βmαn
(
Xm + εV m
)
+
1
βmαn
dm(X+ εV), (6.7)
where
dm(X+ εV) = βm log
(
−
β
B
E
[
exp
(
−
Xm + εV m
βm
)])
. (6.8)
Proposition 6.4. Let ρ be the systemic risk measure defined in (6.1). Then
1. Marginal risk contribution of group m:
d
dǫ
dm(X+ εV)
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= EQm
X
[−V m], m = 1, ..., h.
2. Local causal responsibility:
d
dε
EQm
X
[Y nX+εV]
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= EQm
X
[−V n], n ∈ Im.
3. d
dε
EQm
X+εV
[Z]
∣∣∣
ε=0
= − 1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V m, Z], for any Z∈M
exp,
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4. Marginal risk allocation of institution n ∈ Im:
d
dε
EQm
X+εV
[Y nX+εV]
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= EQm
X
[−V n]−
1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V m, Y
n
X] (6.9)
= EQm
X
[−V n] +
1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V m,X
n]−
1
αn
1
β2m
COV
Qm
X
[V m,Xm], (6.10)
5. Sensitivity of the penalty function:
d
dε
αB(QX+εV)
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
h∑
m=1
1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V m,Xm],
6. Systemic marginal risk contribution:
d
dε
ρ(X+εV)
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
h∑
m=1
∑
i∈Im
EQm
X
[−V i] =
h∑
m=1
EQm
X
[−V m].
Proof. The proof is the results of lengthy computations and is omitted3.
The interpretation of these formulas is not simple because we are dealing with the
systemic probability measure QmX and not with the “physical” measure P. Think of the
difference between the physical measure P and a martingale measure. If we replace QmX
with P, none of the results of Proposition 6.4 will hold in general.
The first term EQm
X
[−V n] in (6.9) or (6.10) is easy to interpret: it is not a systemic
contribution, as it only involves the increment V n in the (same) bank n. If we sum over
all n in the same group, we obtain from (6.9) or (6.10)∑
n∈Im
d
dε
EQm
X+εV
[Y nX+εV]
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= EQm
X
[−V m] =
d
dε
dm(X+εV )
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
. (6.11)
So, this first term EQm
X
[−V n] is the contribution to the marginal risk allocation of bank n
regardless of any systemic influence. Equation (6.11) is the Local Casual Responsibility for
the whole group, but not for the single bank inside each group. The sign of the increment
V n in the first term of (6.9) is here relevant: an increment (positive) corresponds to a
risk reduction, regardless of the dependence structure. If V is deterministic, the marginal
risk allocation to bank n is exactly EQm
X
[−V n] = −V n and no other correction terms are
present.
To understand the other terms in (6.9) or (6.10), take V =V jej with j 6= n. In this
way, the first term in (6.9) disappears (V n = 0) and we obtain
d
dε
EQm
X+εV jej
[Y nX+εV jej ]
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V j ,Xn]−
1
αn
1
β2m
COV
Qm
X
[V j ,Xm].
3The proof can be obtained upon request from the authors.
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To fix the ideas, suppose that COV
Qm
X
[V j ,Xn] < 0, and examine for the moment only the
contribution of 1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V j,Xn]. This component does not depend on the specific αn,
but it depends on the dependence structure between (V j ,Xn). If the systemic risk proba-
bility QmX attributes negative correlation to (V
j ,Xn), then, from the systemic perspective
this is good (independently of the sign of V j): a decrement in bank j is balanced by bank
n, and viceversa. If bank n is negatively correlated (as seen by QmX) with the increment
of bank j, then the risk allocation of bank n should decrease. Therefore, bank n takes
advantage of this, as its risk allocation is reduced ( 1
βm
COV
Qm
X
[V j ,Xn] < 0). Since the
overall marginal risk allocation of the group m is fixed (equal to EQm
X
[−V m] = EQm
X
[−V j ],
from (6.11)), someone else has to pay for such advantage to bank n. This is the last term
in (6.10), discussed next.
For the third component in (6.10), we distinguish between the systemic component
− 1
β2m
COV
Qm
X
[V j ,Xm], which only depends on the aggregate group Xm, and the systemic
relevance 1
αn
of bank n. The systemic quantity is therefore distributed among the various
banks according to 1
αn
. In addition, this term must compensate for the possible risk
reduction term (the second term in (6.10)), as the overall risk allocation to group m is
determined by EQm
X
[−V m] = EQm
X
[−V j ].
Finally Items 1 and 6 express the same property (which holds in general, as shown in
Proposition 5.4) respectively for one group or for the entire system.
6.2 Monotonicity
Another desirable fairness property is monotonicity. It is clear that if C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ CR, then
ρ1(X) ≥ ρ2(X) for the corresponding systemic risk measures
ρi(X) := inf
{
N∑
n=1
Y n | Y ∈ Ci, E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n)
]
≥ B
}
, i = 1, 2.
The two extreme cases occur for C1 := R
N (the deterministic case) and C2 := CR (the
unconstraint scenario dependent case). Hence, we know that when going from deterministic
to scenario-dependent allocations the total systemic risk decreases. It is then desirable that
each institution profits from this decrease in total systemic risk in the sense that also its
individual risk allocation decreases:
ρn1 (X) ≥ ρ
n
2 (X) for each n = 1, ..., N. (6.12)
The opposite would clearly be perceived as unfair. In the next proposition (see in particular
equation (6.15)) we prove that (6.12) holds true, in the context of the grouping Example
2.5, when we compute the risk allocation ρn(X) = EQn
X
[Y nX] using QX. If we would select
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a vector of probability measures R different from QX to compute the risk allocation with
the formula ERn [Y
n
X], the property (6.12) would be in general lost.
For a given partition n and C = C(n), let Y kr , k ∈ Ir, r = 1, · · · , h, be the corresponding
optimal allocations of the primal problem (6.1) and QrX, r = 1, · · · , h, be the optimal
solutions of the corresponding dual problem (3.10) (in this section we suppress the label
X from the optimal allocation YX to ρ(X)).
Consider for some m ∈ {1, · · · , h} a non empty subgroup I ′m of the group Im. Set I
′′
m :=
Im\I
′
m. Then the (h + 1) groups I1, I2, · · · , I
′
m, I
′′
m, Im+1, · · · , Ih corresponds to a new
partition n′. The optimal allocations of the primal problem (6.1) with C = C(n
′) coincide
with Y kr , k ∈ Ir, for r 6= m. For r = m, i ∈ I
′
m, we have the following.
Proposition 6.5. Define with Y im′ , i ∈ I
′
m, the optimal allocation to the primal problem
with C = C(n
′). Then
EQm
X
∑
i∈I′m
Y im
 ≤ ∑
i∈I′m
Y im′ := d
′
m. (6.13)
In particular, if the group I ′m consists of only one single element {i}, then Y
i
m′ is deter-
ministic and
EQm
X
[Y im] ≤ Y
i
m′ for each i ∈ Im. (6.14)
If we compare the deterministic optimal allocation Y∗ (corresponding to C = RN) with the
(random) optimal allocations Y associated to one single group (C = CR ∩ (M
exp)N ), we
conclude
EQX [Y
n] ≤ (Y ∗)n for each n = 1, · · · , d, (6.15)
where QX is the unique optimal solution of the dual problem associated to C = CR∩(M
exp)N .
Proof. Given the subgroup I ′m, define β
′
m :=
∑
k∈I′m
1
αk
. Then the optimal value with respect
to C(n
′) is given by
d′m = β
′
m ln
− βBE
exp
− 1
β′m
∑
k∈I′m
Xk
 .
Summing the components of the solutions relative to C(n) over k ∈ I ′m, we get∑
k∈I′m
Ykm =
∑
k∈I′m
(
1
βmαk
Xm −X
k
)
+
∑
k∈I′m
1
βmαk
dm
=
β′m
βm
Xm −
∑
k∈I′m
Xk
+ β′m
βm
dm.
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Using Jensen inequality we obtain
EQm
X
∑
k∈I′m
Ykm

= β′m ln
exp
 1
β′m
EQm
X
β′m
βm
Xm −
∑
k∈I′m
Xk
+ β′mβm βm ln
(
−
β
B
E
[
exp
(
−
Xm
βm
)])
≤ β′m ln
EQmX
exp
 1
βm
Xm −
1
β′m
∑
k∈I′m
Xk
+ β′m ln
(
−
β
B
E
[
exp
(
−
Xm
βm
)])
= β′m ln
E
exp
(
−Xm
βm
)
exp
(
1
βm
Xm
)
exp
(
− 1
β′m
∑
k∈I′m
Xk
)
E
[
e−
1
βm
Xm
]

+ β′m ln
(
−
β
B
E
[
exp
(
−
Xm
βm
)])
= β′m ln
− βBE
exp
− 1
β′m
∑
k∈I′m
Xk
 = d′m.
We have that (6.14) and (6.15) directly follow by (6.13).
A Appendix
A.1 Properties
Lemma A.1. Under Assumption 2.2, if limx→−∞
(
un(x)
x
)
= +∞ and if limx→+∞
un(x)
x
=
0, then
(a) there exists c ∈ R and b ∈ R+ such that
(i) un(x) ≤ bx+ c for all x ≥ 0 and all n;
(ii) un(x) ≤ 2bx+ c for all x ≤ 0 and all n.
(b) ∀ε > 0 there exists b = b(ε) > 0 such that un(x) ≤ εx+ b for x ≥ 0 and all n.
Proof. Note that dom(un) = R for each n. Hereafter the left derivatives of the concave
increasing functions un are denoted by u
′
n and satisfy u
′
n(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R.
(a) We have the following.
(i) The concavity of each un implies that un(x) ≤ u
′
n(0)x+cn for all x ∈ R (for some
cn) and therefore, setting b := maxn u
′
n(0) ≥ 0 and c ≥ maxn cn, un(x) ≤ bx+ c
for all x ≥ 0.
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(ii) We prove that for every M > 0 there exists a constant d > 0 with un(x) ≤
Mx+ d for all n and x ≤ 0. By taking M = 2b we obtain (ii). The assumption
limx→−∞
(
un(x)
x
)
= +∞, implies that there exists K > 0 (which depends on
M) such that for all n un(x) ≤ Mx for x ≤ −K. Hence Mx − un(x) ≥ 0 for
x ∈ (−∞,−K). It is clear now that since the functionMx−un(x) is continuous
on [−K, 0] we may add a properly chosen d > 0 so that Mx+ d−un(x) ≥ 0 for
all x ∈ (−∞, 0] and all n.
(b) The assumption limx→+∞
un(x)
x
= 0 guarantees the existence of a constant K > 0,
which depends on ε, such that un(x) ≤ εx for x ≥ K and all n. Hence
un(x) ≤ εx+Kε+ sup
n
(
sup
[0,K]
un(s)
)
∀x ≥ 0.
Proof. [of Proposition 2.4] To show ρ > −∞, we suppose by contradiction that ρ(X) =
−∞, for some X ∈MΦ ⊆ L1(P,RN ). Let Ym ∈ C satisfy
∑N
n=1 Y
n
m ↓ −∞, as m → +∞
and Λ(X+Ym) ∈ A for each m. The condition
∑N
n=1 Y
n
m ↓ −∞, as m → +∞ implies∑N
n=1 E[Y
n
m] ↓ −∞, as m→ +∞. Note also that, by Jensen inequality,
B ≤ E[Λ(X+Ym)] ≤ Λ(E[X+Ym]) =
N∑
n=1
un(E[X
n] + E[Y nm]). (A.1)
We now prove that
∑N
n=1 un(E[X
n]+E[Y nm]) ↓ −∞, as m→ +∞, which is in contradiction
with (A.1). Set xm := (x
n
m)
N
n=1 where x
n
m := E [Y
n
m] . Since
∑N
n=1 x
n
m ↓ −∞, there must
exist n0 ∈ {1, · · · , N} and a subsequence xhm such that x
n0
hm
↓ −∞ as m→ +∞. With an
abuse of notation, denote again such subsequence xhm with xm. Then we have x
n0
m ↓ −∞.
If there exists another coordinate n1 ∈ {1, · · · , N} \n0 such that limm→∞x
n1
m = −∞, take
the subsequence xkm such that x
n1
km
↓ −∞. By diagonal procedure, we obtain one single
sequence denoted again by xm such that x
n0
m ↓ −∞ and x
n1
m ↓ −∞, as m→ +∞. We may
adopt this procedure (at most N times) also in the case lim supm→∞ x
n2
m = +∞ for some
coordinate n2. At the end, we will obtain one single sequence xm and three disjoint sets of
coordinate indices N−, N+, N
∗ such that
xnm ↓ −∞ if n ∈ N− ⊆ {1, · · · , N} ,
xnm ↑ +∞ if n ∈ N+ ⊆ {1, · · · , N} ,
| xnm |≤ K for all m and all n ∈ N
∗ = {1, · · · , N} \(N− ∪N+),
where K is a constant independent of m. We know that N− 6= ∅, since n0 ∈ N− (but the
other two sets N+ and N
∗ may be empty). Since
∑N
n=1 x
n
m ↓ −∞, we deduce that, for
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large m,
∑N
n=1 x
n
m ≤ 0 so that∑
n∈N+
xnm ≤ −
∑
n∈N−
xnm −
∑
n∈N∗
xnm ≤ −
∑
n∈N−
xnm +NK, for each fixed (large) m. (A.2)
Now we use the inequalities of Lemma A.1 (a) and in (A.2). We obtain, for each fixed
large m, that
N∑
n=1
un(E[X
n] + E[Y nm]) =
∑
n∈N+
un(E[X
n] + xnm) +
∑
n∈N−
un(E[X
n] + xnm) +
∑
n∈N∗
un(E[X
n] + xnm)
≤ C1 +
∑
n∈N+
bxnm +
∑
n∈N−
2bxnm +
∑
n∈N∗
un(K)
≤ C2 −
∑
n∈N−
bxnm + bNK +
∑
n∈N−
2bxnm = C3 + b
∑
n∈N−
xnm
with the constants C1, C2, C3 all independent from m. Then b
∑
n∈N−
xnm ↓ −∞, as m →
+∞, since xnm ↓ −∞ for each n ∈ N−. This shows ρ(X) > −∞ for all X ∈M
Φ.
Let X ∈MΦ. Then E[Λ(X)] > −∞ and X+m1 ↑ +∞ P-a.s. if m→ +∞, m ∈ R, where
1 = (1, · · · ,1). As E[Λ(X)] > −∞, we have that E[Λ(X+m1)] > −∞ for m > 0, and by
monotone convergence it follows that E[Λ(X + m1)]↑Λ(+∞) > B. Since RN ⊆ C, then
m1 ∈ C and {Y ∈ C, Λ(X+Y) ∈ A} 6= ∅, so that ρ(X) < +∞.
Hence ρ : MΦ → R and then convexity and monotonicity are straightforward. The re-
maining properties in (a) are a consequence of Theorem A.2 and the fact that MΦ is a
Banach space.
We now prove (b). We claim that if E[Λ(X+Y)] > B then Y ∈ C can not be optimal:
Y ∈ C and E[Λ(X+Y)] > B =⇒
N∑
n=1
Y n > ρ=(X). (A.3)
Indeed, the continuity of un and E[un(Z
n)] > −∞ for all Z ∈ MΦ imply the existence of
δ ∈RN+ , δ 6= 0, such that E[Λ(X+Y − δ)] = B and so, as Y − δ ∈ C, ρ
=(X) ≤
∑N
n=1(Y
n−
δn) <
∑N
n=1 Y
n. This implies ρ(X) = ρ=(X), otherwise if ρ(X) < ρ=(X), then by def-
inition of ρ(X), there would exist ε > 0 and Y ∈ C satisfying E[Λ(X + Y)] > B and∑N
n=1 Y
n ≤ ρ(X)+ε<ρ=(X), which contradicts (A.3).
We now show uniqueness by contradiction. Suppose that ρ(X) is attained by two distinct
Y1 ∈ C and Y2 ∈ C, so that P(Y
j
1 6= Y
j
2) > 0 for some j. Then we have
ρ(X) =
N∑
n=1
Y n1 =
N∑
n=1
Y n2 and E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y nk )
]
= B for k = 1, 2.
For λ ∈ [0, 1] set Yλ := λY1 + (1− λ)Y2. Then Yλ ∈ C, as C is convex. This implies
N∑
n=1
Y nλ = λ
N∑
n=1
Y n1 + (1− λ)
N∑
n=1
Y n2 = ρ(X), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1],
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and for λ ∈ (0, 1)
B = λE
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n1 )
]
+ (1− λ)E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y n2 )
]
<
< E
[
N∑
n=1
un(λX
n+λY n1 + (1− λ)X
n+(1− λ)Y n2 )
]
= E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Y nλ )
]
,
where we used that uj is strictly concave and P(Y
j
1 6= Y
j
2 ) > 0. This is a contradiction
with ρ(X) = ρ=(X) and (A.3).
A.2 Orlicz setting
We now recall an important result for the characterization of systemic risk measures of the
form (2.5) on the Orlicz Heart.
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 1, [9]). Suppose that L is a Fréchet lattice and ρ : L → R∪{+∞}
is convex and monotone decreasing. Then
1. ρ is continuous in the interior of dom(ρ), with respect to the topology of L,
2. ρ is subdifferentiable in the interior of dom(ρ),
3. for all X ∈ int(dom(ρ))
ρ(X) = max
Q∈L∗+
{Q(−X)− α(Q)} ,
where L∗ is the dual of L (for the topology for which L is a Frechet lattice), L∗+ =
{Q ∈ L∗ | Q is positive} and α : L∗ → R ∪ {+∞} , defined by
α(Q) = sup
X∈L
{Q(−X)− ρ(X)} ,
is σ(L∗,L)-lsc and convex.
A.2.1 Dual representation in the Orlicz setting
Proof. [of Proposition 3.4]
Consider the convex functional Θn : M
φn(R) → R defined by Θn(Z) := E[−un(Z)]
and let Θ∗n be its convex conjugate. We have: Θn(Z
n) > −∞, as Mφn(R) ⊆ L1(P)
and E[un(Z
n)] ≤ un(E[Z
n]) < +∞; Θn(Z
n) < +∞, as Zn ∈Mφn(R) implies E[un(Z
n)] >
−∞. Then we have Θ∗n(ξ) = E[vn(−ξ)], for ξ ∈ L
φ∗n(R) by [9], Section 5.2. Let f : MΦ → R
be defined by f(Z) :=
∑N
n=1 E[−un(Z
n)] +B =
∑N
n=1Θn(Z
n) +B, and observe that
A :=
{
Z ∈MΦ |
N∑
n=1
E[un(Z
n)] ≥ B
}
=
{
Z ∈MΦ | f(Z) ≤ 0
}
.
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We have that f is convex and decreasing with respect to the componentwise order relation.
Let f∗(ξ) be its convex conjugate, for ξ ∈ LΦ
∗
. We assume that ξ 6= 0. By the Fenchel
inequality E[Zξ] ≤ f(Z)+f∗(ξ), we obtain for all Z ∈ A and λ > 0,
E[−Zξ] =λE[Z(−
1
λ
ξ)] ≤λ[f(Z) + f∗(−
1
λ
ξ)] ≤λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ), P-a.s.
Hence
αB(ξ) := sup
Z∈A
{E[−Zξ]} ≤ inf
λ>0
λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ). (A.4)
By definition of the convex Fenchel conjugate and the fact that MΦ is a product space, we
have
f∗(ξ) : = sup
Z∈MΦ
{E[ξZ]− f(Z)} = −B + sup
Z∈MΦ
{
N∑
n=1
E[ξnZ
n]−
N∑
n=1
Θn(Z
n)
}
= −B +
N∑
n=1
(
sup
Z∈MΦ(R)
{E[ξnZ]−Θn(Z)}
)
= −B +
N∑
n=1
Θ∗n(ξn),
where we have used (2.4), and therefore
inf
λ>0
λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ) = inf
λ>0
(
−Bλ+ λ
N∑
n=1
Θ∗n(−
1
λ
ξn)
)
= inf
λ>0
(
−Bλ+ λ
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
1
λ
ξn
)])
.
To prove (3.7) we need only to show that there is no duality gap in (A.4), i.e., if αB(ξ) <
+∞ then
αB(ξ) = inf
λ>0
λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ). (A.5)
Observe that, by the definition of f∗, we have for each λ > 0
λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ) := sup
Z∈MΦ
{E[−ξZ]− λf(Z)} .
As ξ is not identically equal to 0 and MΦ is a linear space, we have supZ∈MΦ {E[−ξZ]} =
+∞ and therefore
inf
λ>0
λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ) = inf
λ>0
sup
Z∈MΦ
{E[−ξZ]− λf(Z)} = inf
λ≥0
sup
Z∈MΦ
{E[−ξZ]− λf(Z)} .
We claim that
inf
λ≥0
sup
Z∈MΦ
{E[−ξZ]− λf(Z)} = sup
Z∈MΦ
inf
λ≥0
{E[−ξZ]− λf(Z)} . (A.6)
Assuming (A.6), we may immediately conclude that
inf
λ>0
λf∗(−
1
λ
ξ) = sup
Z∈MΦ
inf
λ≥0
{E[−ξZ]− λf(Z)} = sup
Z∈MΦ
{
E[−ξZ]− sup
λ≥0
λf(Z)
}
= sup
Z∈A
{E[−ξZ]} := αB(ξ).
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We now prove (A.6) by showing the equivalent condition:
sup
λ≥0
inf
Z∈MΦ
{E[ξZ] + λf(Z)} = inf
Z∈MΦ
sup
λ≥0
{E[ξZ] + λf(Z)} . (A.7)
In order to make an easy comparison with the results in [43], let f0(Z) := E[ξZ]. Consider
the function F : MΦ × R→ R∪{+∞} , defined by
F (Z, u) =
{
f0(Z) if Z ∈M
Φ and f(Z) ≤ u,
+∞ otherwise,
see (2.8) in [43], and the associated Lagrangian K(Z, λ), see (4.4) in [43]. Then (A.7) can
be rewritten as
sup
λ≥0
inf
Z∈MΦ
K(Z, λ) = inf
Z∈MΦ
sup
λ≥0
K(Z, λ). (A.8)
As f : MΦ → R is convex decreasing and finite valued, Theorem A.2 guarantees that it
is continuous on MΦ (for the MΦ-norm). Therefore, see Example 1 on pages 7 and 22 in
[43], the function F is closed convex in (Z, u).
Then the absence of duality gap in (A.5) is now expressed by (A.8) and it follows from
Theorems 17 and 18 of [43], provided that the (convex) optimal value function, defined in
(4.7) [43],
ϕ(u) := inf
Z∈MΦ
F (Z, u), u ∈ R,
is bounded from above in a neighborhood of 0. This is easily verified by showing the
existence of an element Z0 ∈ M
Φ such that u → F (Z0, u) is bounded from above in a
neighborhood of 0. This concludes the proof of (3.7).
To prove (3.8) we set ξn :=
dQn
dP
≥ 0 a.s.. Recall from Lemma A.5 that vn is strictly convex
with vn(+∞) = +∞, vn(0
+) = un(+∞), limz→+∞
vn(z)
z
= +∞ because of Assumption
2.2, item 2, and vn is continuously differentiable. As u
′
n(+∞) = 0 and u
′
n(−∞) = +∞, we
get v′n(0) = −∞ and v
′
n(+∞) = +∞.
Set η = 1
λ
∈ (0,+∞) and consider the differentiable function F : (0,+∞)→ R defined by
F (η) := −Bη + η
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
1
η
ξn
)]
.
Then αB(ξ) = infη>0 F (η) and (3.9) can be rewritten as
F ′(η) = 0 (A.9)
with
F ′(η) = −B +
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
1
η
ξn
)]
−
1
η
N∑
n=1
E
[
ξnv
′
n
(
1
η
ξn
)]
.
Note that if η∗ > 0 is the solution to (A.9), then by replacing such η∗ into F (η) we
immediately obtain (3.8).
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Next, thanks to the integrability conditions provided by Lemma A.4, we show the existence
of the solution η∗ > 0 of (A.9). First we consider η → +∞. Since
∑N
n=1 vn(0
+) =∑N
n=1 un(+∞) > B by Assumption 2.2, we have that
limη→+∞ −B +
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
1
η
ξn
)]
> 0.
Moreover, v′n(0) = −∞ shows that
limη→+∞ −
1
η
N∑
n=1
E
[
ξnv
′
n
(
1
η
ξn
)]
≥ 0.
Hence limη→+∞F
′(η) > 0. We now look at η → 0:
lim
η→0
F ′(η) = −B + lim
η→0
N∑
n=1
E
[
vn
(
1
η
ξn
)]
−
1
η
N∑
n=1
E
[
ξnv
′
n
(
1
η
ξn
)]
= −B + lim
t→+∞
N∑
n=1
E [vn (tξn)]− t
N∑
n=1
E
[
ξnv
′
n (tξn)
]
= −B +
N∑
n=1
lim
t→+∞
E
[
vn (tξn)− tξnv
′
n (tξn)
]
.
The convexity of vn implies that for any fixed z0 > 0 and z > z0
vn(z)− vn(z0) ≤ v
′
n(z)(z − z0).
From limz→+∞
v(z)
z
= +∞, v′n(z)→ +∞ as z → +∞ and
vn(z)− zv
′
n(z) ≤ vn(z0)− z0v
′
n(z) ↓ −∞ as z → +∞,
we have by monotone convergence
lim
t→+∞
E
[
vn (tξn)− tξnv
′
n (tξn)
]
= −∞,
so that limη→0F
′(η) = −∞. By the continuity of F ′ we obtain the existence of the solution
η∗ > 0 for (A.9). Uniqueness follows from the strict convexity of F .
Remark A.3. In [28], (A.5) is deduced, by different means, in a L∞(R) setting and in the
one-dimensional case. In [3], (A.5) is obtained, by different means, in the multi-dimensional
deterministic case, i.e. in RN .
A.3 Auxiliary results for existence
The following auxiliary result is standard and can be found in many articles on utility max-
imization, see for example Lemma 18, [8]. Recall that we are working under Assumption
2.2, Item 4.
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Lemma A.4. Let υ : R+ → R be a strictly convex differentiable function with υ
′(0+) =
−∞, υ′(+∞) = +∞ and let Q≪ P. Then
(a) υ′(λdQ
dP
) ∈ L1(Q) ∀λ > 0;
(b) F (λ) , E[dQ
dP
υ′(λdQ
dP
)] defines a bijection between (0,+∞) and (−∞,+∞).
By applying the classical convex duality real valued theory from [42] we get:
Lemma A.5. The convex conjugate function v : R → (−∞,+∞] of u, given by v(y) =
supx∈R {u(x)− xy}, is a proper lsc convex function, equal to +∞ on (−∞, 0), bounded
from below on R, finite valued strictly convex, continuously differentiable on (0,+∞) and
satisfying
v(+∞) = +∞, v(0+) = u(+∞), v′(0+) = −∞, v′(+∞) = +∞,
u′(x) = (v′)−1(−x), u(−v′(y)) = −yv′(y) + v(y), ∀y ≥ 0,
where the usual rule 0 · ∞ = 0 is applied.
Proposition A.6 (Proposition 3.6, [11]). Let Q≪ P. For all c ∈ R the optimizer λ(c;Q)
of
min
λ>0
{
E
[
v
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
+ λc
}
is the unique positive solution of the first order condition
EQ
[
v′
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
+ c = 0. (A.10)
If sup
{
E[u(g)] | g ∈ L1(Q) and EQ[g] ≤ c
}
< u(+∞), the random variable ĝ := −v′(λ(c;Q)dQ
dP
)
belongs to the set
{
g ∈ L1(Q) | EQ[g] = c
}
, satisfies u(ĝ) ∈ L1(P), and
min
λ>0
{
E
[
v
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
+ λc
}
= sup
{
E[u(g)] | g ∈ L1(Q) and EQ[g] ≤ c
}
= E[u(ĝ)] < u(+∞).
A.4 Proofs for Section 4.2
Proof. [of Proposition 4.4] From Mφn ⊆ L1(P, Qn) ⊆ L1(Qn) we clearly have Un(a
n) ≤
U˜n(a
n) ≤ Ûn(a
n) ≤ un(+∞), so that
if Un(a
n) = u(+∞) then Un(a
n) = U˜n(a
n) = Ûn(a
n) = un(+∞). (A.11)
By the Fenchel inequality we get
E [un(X
n +W )] ≤ λ (EQn [X
n] + EQn [W ]) + E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]
,
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and hence
Un(a
n) ≤ U˜n(a
n) ≤ Ûn(a
n) ≤ inf
λ>0
{
λ (EQn [X
n] + an) + E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]}
< +∞,
(A.12)
as E
[
vn
(
λdQ
n
dP
)]
< +∞. Therefore (4.5) is a consequence of (A.11) and (4.7). To show
(4.7), consider the integral functional I : Mφn → R defined by I(Xn) = E [un(X
n)] . It
is finite valued, monotone increasing and concave on Mφn (as E[un(X
n)] ≤ un(E[X
n]) <
+∞), and therefore, by the Theorem A.2, it is norm-continuous on Mφn . We can then
follow the well known duality approach (see for example [11]). Consider the convex cone
D0 :=
{
W ∈Mφn | EQn [W ] ≤ 0
}
which is the polar cone of the one dimensional cone
D :=
{
λdQ
n
dP
| λ ≥ 0
}
, so that the bipolar D00 coincide with D. Let δD0 : M
φn →
R∪{+∞} be the support functional of D0. By [39], or directly by hand, the concave
conjugate I∗ : Lφ
∗
n → R∪{−∞} is given by I∗(ξn) = E [−vn(ξ
n)] and so, by Fenchel
duality Theorem,
Un(a
n) = sup
W∈D0
E [un(X
n + an +W )] = sup
Z∈D0+Xn+an
E [un(Z)]
= sup
Z∈Mφn
{E [un(Z)]− δD0+Xn+an(Z)} = min
ξn∈Lφ
∗
n
{
δ∗D0+Xn+an(ξ
n)− E [−vn(ξ
n)]
}
= min
ξn∈Lφ
∗
n
{E[ξn(Xn + an)] + δD00(ξ
n) + E [vn(ξ
n)]}
= min
ξn∈D00
{E[ξn(Xn + an)] + E [vn(ξ
n)]} = min
λ>0
{
λ (EQn [X
n] + an) + E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]}
,
where we used δ∗
D0
= δD00 , D
00 = D and the fact that the minimizer is obtained at λ > 0,
otherwise if λ = 0 then Un(a
n) = E [vn (0)] = un(+∞). We conclude the proof by proving
(4.6). From the inequality (A.12), it is clear that Un(−∞) = −∞. Define
Vn(λ) := E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]
+ λEQn [X
n].
When Un(a
n) < un(+∞), from (4.7) we have that
Un(a
n) = inf
λ>0
{Vn(λ) + λa
n} ,
which shows that Un and Vn are conjugate of each other, i.e., Vn(λ) = supan>0 {Un(a
n)− λan} .
From Lemmas A.4 and A.5 we know that the convex function Vn is differentiable on (0,+∞)
and therefore Un is differentiable on (−∞,+∞) and
U ′n(a) = (V
′
n)
−1(−a) > 0.
We only need to show the last two conditions. As vn(0
+) = un(+∞) = +∞ then Vn(0
+) =
+∞. Since v′n(0
+) = −∞ we get V ′n(0
+) = −∞ and U ′n(+∞) = 0. Moreover
V ′n(+∞) = lim
λ→+∞
Vn(λ)
λ
= lim
λ→+∞
1
λ
E
[
vn
(
λ
dQn
dP
)]
+ EQn [X
n]
Jensen
≥ lim
λ→+∞
1
λ
vn (λ) + EQn[X
n] = v′n (∞) + EQn [X
n] = +∞
which implies U ′n(−∞) = +∞.
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Proof. [of Lemma 4.7] The set K is clearly closed. We show that is bounded. For N = 1
it is true. Let N > 1. First we prove that, for all j = 1, ..., N ,
Uj(a)
1 +
∑
n 6=j
Un(A− (N − 1)a)
Uj(a)
→ −∞ as a ↓ −∞. (A.13)
Recall that Un(−∞) = −∞ and Un(+∞) ≤ un(+∞) for all n. Suppose that for some
k ∈ {1, ..., N}, uk(+∞) < +∞. Then Uk(+∞) < +∞ and for all j = 1, ..., N
lim
a→−∞
{
Uk(A− (N − 1)a)
Uj(a)
}
= 0. (A.14)
Now suppose that for some k ∈ {1, ..., N}, uk(+∞) = +∞. Then Proposition 4.4 shows
that Uk(a
k) < +∞ = uk(+∞),U
′
k > 0, U
′
k(−∞) = +∞, U
′
k(+∞) = 0. By l’Hopital’s rule,
for all j = 1, ..., N we obtain again
lim
a→−∞
{
Uk(A− (N − 1)a)
Uj(a)
}
= lim
a→−∞
−(N − 1)U ′k(A− (N − 1)a)
U ′j(a)
= 0. (A.15)
From (A.14) and (A.15) we deduce that (A.13) holds true.
We conclude that for any constant B there exists a constant R such that for all j =
1, ..., N and a < R
Uj(a)
1 +
∑
n 6=j
Un(A− (N − 1)a)
Uj(a)
 < B.
Let a ∈ K and let i be such that ai = min{a1, ..., aN}. Note that aj ≤ A− (N − 1)ai for
all j = 1, ..., N because
∑N
n=1 a
n ≤ A holds. Assume that ai < R. Then
B ≤
N∑
n=1
Un(a
n) ≤ Ui(a
i)
1 +
∑
n 6=i
Un(A− (N − 1)a
i)
Ui(ai)
 , (A.16)
which is a contradiction. Thus aj ≥ R for all j = 1, ..., N , and then also aj ≤ A−(N−1)R
for all j = 1, ..., N because
∑N
n=1 a
n ≤ A holds. This proves the claim.
Let X ∈ MΦ and consider the function F (δ) := E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n − δ)
]
, δ ∈ R.
If Y ∈ MΦ, then F is finite valued and concave on R, hence continuous on R (see
the discussion at the beginning of Section4.2). However, when Y ∈ L1(Q) satisfies
E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n)
]
> B (with the understanding that un(X
n + Y n) ∈ L1(P) for
each n), it is not any more evident if F is continuous on R, as one has to guarantee that
E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Y n − δ)
]
> −∞, for δ > 0.
Lemma A.7. If X ∈MΦ and Z ∈ L1(Q) satisfy E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Zn)
]
> B then there
exists Z˜ ∈ L1(Q) satisfying
∑N
n=1 EQn [Z˜
n] <
∑N
n=1 EQn [Z
n] and E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Z˜n)
]
=
B.
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Proof. Set An := {X
n + Zn > kn} and let kn ∈ R satisfy P(An) > 0 and Q
n(An) > 0. For
any δ > 0, set Z˜n := (Zn − δ1An)n ∈ L
1(Q) and G(δ) := E
[∑N
n=1 un(X
n + Zn − δ1An)
]
.
Then
G(δ) = E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Zn)1ACn
]
+ E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Zn − δ)1An
]
≥ E
[
N∑
n=1
un(X
n + Zn)1ACn
]
+ E
[
N∑
n=1
un(kn − δ)1An
]
> −∞,
which implies that G is continuous on R+ and the thesis follows.
Proof. [of Lemma 4.8] From (3.5) and ρQB (X) = ρ˜
Q
B (X), note that the penalty function
can also be written as
αB(Q) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn[X
n]− ρQB (X) = −
N∑
n=1
EQn[X
n]− ρ˜QB (X) =
= sup
{
N∑
n=1
EQn [−Z
n] | Z ∈L1(P;Q), E[Λ(Z)] ≥ B
}
.
Set
c=(Q):= inf
{
N∑
n=1
EQn[Z
n] | Z ∈L1(P;Q), E[Λ(Z)] = B
}
.
Similarly to the proof of (A.3), we show that:
Z ∈L1(P;Q) and E[Λ(Z)] > B =⇒
N∑
n=1
EQn [Z
n] > c=(Q), (A.17)
Indeed, Lemma A.7 implies the existence Z˜ ∈ L1(P;Q) satisfying
∑N
n=1 EQn [Z˜
n] <
∑N
n=1 EQn [Z
n]
and E[Λ(Z˜)] = B and therefore c=(Q) ≤
∑N
n=1 EQn [Z˜
n] <
∑N
n=1 EQn [Z
n]. It follows that
c(Q) :=− αB(Q)= inf
{
N∑
n=1
EQn[Z
n] | Z ∈L1(P;Q), E[Λ(Z)] ≥ B
}
= c=(Q).
Indeed, −∞ < c(Q) ≤c=(Q) and assume by contradiction that c(Q) < c=(Q). By
definition of c(Q), there exist ε > 0 and Z ∈L1(P;Q) such that E[Λ(Z)] > B and∑N
n=1 EQn [Z
n] ≤ c(Q) + ε<c=(Q), which contradicts (A.17).
Uniqueness then follows from an argument similar to the one applied at the end of the
proof of Proposition 2.4, replacing
∑N
n=1 Y
n with
∑N
n=1 EQn [Y
n].
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